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Affirmative action is so burning it's boring. Why? Partly because so much
of what one sees and hears on the subject smacks of hypocrisy or speaking in
code. Exhibit A: the name of California's affirmative-action-killing referendum,
the "Civil Rights Initiative." Exhibit B: the term "affirmative action." Exhibit
C: "I oppose affirmative action because it's harmful to minorities." Exhibit D:
"Diversity is not counter to merit; it's an aspect of merit." Exhibit E: "[TIhe
fact that he is black and a minority has nothing to do with this in the sense
that he is the best qualified at this time."'
This Essay rethinks the constitutionality of race-based, governmental
affirmative action measures. There are, I know, a thousand essays on the same
topic already. I make one promise: Readers who persevere will learn
something new.
First, although it is a matter of public record, most lawyers and judges are
unaware that Congress in the 1860s repeatedly enacted statutes allocating
special benefits to blacks on the express basis of race (and I am not referring
to the well-known Freedmen's Bureau Acts,2 which did not rely on express
racial classifications). Accordingly, to be true to their principles, two of the
five Justices in the prevailing anti-affirmative action majority-Justices Scalia
and Thomas, whose commitment to original understandings and practices is
also a matter of record-should drop their categorical opposition to race-based
affirmative action measures.
Second, strict scrutiny doctrine, as it has been applied to affirmative action,
can no longer survive strict scrutiny. I don't mean this statement figuratively.
I mean that strict scrutiny doctrine, understood as it has been in the recent
affirmative action cases, can no longer satisfy its own doctrinal requirements.
Current affirmative action law may be the first instance in our jurisprudence
of a constitutional doctrine unconstitutional under itself.
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Finally, and most important, the Court's recent affirmative action decisions
have consummated a remarkable but unremarked-upon transformation in the
entire analytic structure of heightened scrutiny doctrine. One powerful function
of strict scrutiny has always been that of "smoking out" invidious purposes
masquerading behind putatively legitimate public policy. But under today's
affirmative action doctrine, strict scrutiny has become altogether different. It
has become a cost-benefit test measuring whether a law that falls (according
to the Court itself) squarely within the prohibition of the equal protection
guarantee is justified by the specially important social gains that it will
achieve.3
This shift in the use and understanding of strict scrutiny is momentous, not
only for equal protection law, but for every field of constitutional law in which
the compelling state interest test figures. Or rather it would be momentous, if
it really were the law. But it cannot be. Strict scrutiny cannot serve as a
general escape hatch through which reasons of state may trump acknowledged
constitutional injuries. As a smoking-out device, heightened scrutiny is
sensible. As a cost-benefit justificatory test, it is indefensible. Or so I will
argue.
This argument, however, will not decide affirmative action's
constitutionality. Part of the problem with current doctrine is its effort to pack
far too much of the difficult work of equal protection analysis into a
determination of the appropriate "standard of review." Straightening out strict
scrutiny in the affirmative action cases can only strip away a certain false
doctrinal mesh, leaving exposed the contending claims of color-conscious and
colorblind justice.
But the debate over colorblindness in constitutional law, whose thrusts and
parries are so well known, will raise very different questions when the cost-
benefit approach of current doctrine is systematically stripped away. For
example, the Justices who have found against affirmative action programs
repeatedly have done so on the ground that affirmative action threatens
inadvertently to entrench racial thinking and to stigmatize minorities.
Defenders of affirmative action tend to respond to this assertion by denying the
reality of these harms or by arguing that they are outweighed by affirmative
action's benefits. But this entire set of arguments, both for and against, is in
fact constitutionally irrelevant.
Throughout Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, inadvertent harm to
minorities, without more, is rejected as a basis of constitutional invalidity or
even of heightened scrutiny.4 Equal protection jurisprudence, outside the arena
of affirmative action, generally does not engage in cost-benefit analysis. It does
not purport to measure up and balance the social gains and losses a law will
3. Readers may think that this paraphrase must be exaggerated. It is not. See infra Section n.C.
4. See infra notes 81, 83-85 and accompanying text.
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produce. The constitutional question is instead whether a law embodies an
invidious or otherwise constitutionally impermissible purpose. And this must
be the constitutional question with respect to affirmative action as well. The
degree to which affirmative action inadvertently entrenches racism or harms
minorities is of fundamental importance to affirmative action's merits as a
matter of policy. But it is irrelevant to affirmative action's constitutionality.
The ultimate constitutional question presented by race-based affirmative
action-by no means an easy question-is whether whites' equal protection
rights are violated when the government purposefully acts to assist blacks and
other minorities by granting them special opportunities.
Part I of this Essay describes the failure of those who champion strict
construction to live up to their principles when it comes to affirmative action.
Part II analyzes current doctrine's treatment of strict scrutiny as a cost-benefit
test rather than as a device for smoking out constitutionally illegitimate
purposes. Part III confronts the debate over colorblindness as it would be
presented if strict scrutiny were restored to its proper footing and concludes
that standard affirmative action programs are in fact constitutional, however
unwise they may be as policy in many contexts. Part IV adds a postscript on
Romer v. Evans5 and California's Civil Rights Initiative;6 the fonner confirms
the equal protection analysis offered in this Essay, and the latter, I suggest, is
constitutional for the same reasons that affirmative action is. Although the
Initiative may be a racial classification under the extant precedent, neither the
Initiative nor standard affirmative action plans meet the criterion of invidious
purpose necessary to render a racial classification unconstitutional.
I. STRICT CONSTRUCTION
In a recent televised address, Senator Orrin Hatch-overseer of the
nation's judicial confirmation process-vilified "activist" judges while lionizing
those who have held the line against affirmative action. He was applauded
roundly for both points. Evidently his audience felt that these two positions
could be held by one person at the same time. And so they can, to judge from
the opinions of some of our best-known judicial figures, such as Justices Scalia
and Thomas and former Judge Bork. All three are pupils in that interpretive
school that famously instructs judges to adhere to the letter of the law, to the
5. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
6. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31.
7. Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Speech Before the Federalist Society in Washington. D C (Nov 17, 1996).
see also Al Kamen, Chainmans Call on tihe Court, WASH POST. Nov 18. 1996. at A19 ("[Senator Hatch]
listed a parade of horribles of what could happen if the president gets to nominate even one liberal ctivist'
to the Supreme Court: 'Almost certainly' lower court judges would be allowed to expand use of racial and
gender preferences ....").
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"original understanding,"8 or, if these are ambiguous, then to "the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to,
[an] asserted right can be identified."9 On this view, if at the time of
enactment there was a specific understanding about the permissibility of a
certain kind of law, judges today have no business altering that result.'0 That
would be government by "authoritarian judicial oligarchy.""
When it comes to affirmative action, these strict constructionists12 are
strict indeed, holding that no governmental program "that operates on the basis
of race" is "in accord with the letter" of the Constitution. 3 Pro-affirmative
action holdings are for them just another example of "the politics of
ultraliberalism . .. driving the law."' 4 It follows, surely, that a strict rule
condemning race-based affirmative action comports with strict construction,
that such a rule either must reflect the original understanding of the 1860s, or
at the very least must be the rule evinced by the most specific, relevant
historical practices. For how else could these honorable men take the position
they take?
In July 1866, the Thirty-Ninth Congress-the selfsame Congress that had
just framed the Fourteenth Amendment-passed a statute appropriating money
for certain poor women and children.' 5 Which ones? The act appropriated
money for "the relief of destitute colored women and children."' 6 In 1867,
the Fortieth Congress-the same body that was driving the Fourteenth
Amendment down the throat of the bloody South-passed a statute providing
8. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143-60 (1990).
9. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.).
10. Cf., e.g., Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing against congressional
authority to regulate manufacturing or agriculture because "[alt the time the original Constitution was
ratified ... the term 'commerce' was used in contradistinction to productive activities such as
manufacturing and agriculture"); Tony Mauro, Scalia Says There Is No Right To Die, USA TODAY, Oct.
28, 1996, at 1A ("'It's absolutely plain there is no right to die,' Scalia [said] .... Scalia said his view wits
based on the fact that laws against suicide were universally accepted at the time of the drafting of the
Constitution.").
11. BORK, supra note 8, at 160.
12. Justice Scalia does not embrace the term "strict construction." See Antonin Scalia, Coimnon.Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution
and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 23 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997). I use the term to refer to any constitutional method that (1) insists on strict adherence to a putatively
historically fixed meaning (whether said to be fixed by text or by original intent); and (2) on that basis
campaigns against all introduction of judicial inquiry into right and wrong or just and unjust.
13. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[Glood
intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the govemment may not
make distinctions on the basis of race.").
14. BORK, supra note 8, at 107; accord id. at 246.
15. See Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 296, 14 Stat. 310.
16. Id., 14 Stat. at 317 (emphasis added). The act appropriated money for the "National association
for the relief of destitute colored women and children," id., an association incorporated by federal statute
three years earlier "for the purpose of supporting . . . aged or indigent and destitute colored women and
children." Act of Feb. 14, 1863, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 650, 650.
[Vol. 107: 427
1997] Affirmative Action
money for the destitute in the District of Columbia. 17 (And remember that
Congress is the constitutional analogue of a state legislature for the District of
Columbia.) What classification did Congress adopt in this poor-relief statute?
Relief was to be given to the destitute "'colored" persons in the nation's
capital.' 8 Year after year in the Civil War period-before, during, and after
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment-Congress made special
appropriations and adopted special procedures for awarding bounty and prize
money to the "colored" soldiers and sailors of the Union Armly.'9
These statutes are not like the well-known Freedmen's Bureau Acts20 of
the same period,2' directing benefits to blacks but using classifications that
were formally race-neutral.2 - On the contrary, these statutes expressly refer
to color in the allotment of federal benefits. Nor are these statutes buried in
archives deep within the Library of Congress. They are, if not well-known, at
least knowable by anyone who takes three minutes with the United States
Statutes at Large (look up "colored" in the indexes for more). -' What do they
prove? Only that those who profess fealty to the "original understanding," who
17. See Resolution of Mar. 16, 1867, No 4. 15 Stat 20
18. Id., 15 Stat. at 20 (emphasis added)
19. E.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch 227, 17 Stat 510. 528 (emphasis added). Act of Mar 3. 1869. ch
122, 15 Stat. 301, 302 (emphasis added); Resolution of June 15. 1866. No 46. 14 Stat 357. 358-59
(emphasis added).
20. Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200. 14 Stat 173. Act of Mar 3. 1865. ch 90. 13 Star 507
21. For originalist arguments in favor of affirmative action on the basis ol the Freedmen's Bureau
Acts, see Louis H. Pollak, "Mr. Chief Justce. May It Pleaae the Court "', in CONSTrUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT iN AMERiCA 247, 252 (Ronald K L Collins ed. 1980). and Eric Schnapper. Affirnat le
Action and tie Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment. 71 VA L Ri'v 753 (1985)
22. See Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting. Inc v FCC. Tito Concepts of Equahot. 04 I-tlAV L
REv. 107, 111 n.21 (1990) ("[Rleference to the Reconstruction-era Freedmen's Bureaus is not quite
apposite: they no more accorded benefits in terms of race than did the Emancipation Proclam tion ")
23. Schnapper cited a number of these statutes over 10 years ago See Schnapper. supra note 21. at
775, 778-80. Unfortunately, his references to these laws appear in the middle of a much lengthier dts.ussion
of the Freedmen's Bureau Acts as race-conscious legislation See id at 754-75. 780-83 As a result, some
concluded that Schnapper's essay was "convincingly rebutted" by those who pointed out that the
Freedmen's Bureau Acts, at least after 1865. purposelully employed race-neutral language Jeflrey Rosen.
Tie Color-Blind Court, 45 Ami. U. L. REV 791. 795 (1996) (citing. for example. Paul Moreno. Racial
Classifications and Reconstruction Legtzlaron. 61 J S HIST 271 (1995)) But while the Freedtmen's Bureau
Acts were arguably race-neutral, the statutes referred to in the text above ,ere not And these statutes
convincingly rebut even the most tortuously phrased conclusions of those who deny the existence of race-
based affirmative action in the Reconstruction penod 'It is not unreasonable to conclude that the
Reconstruction Congress might have allowed race-conscious remedial legislation ,% ith prelerence lot blacks.
since it permitted the anti-black variety 1!l But in lact it did not PAUL D MoRi--No. FRost DiRi-CT
ACTION TO AFFiRMATIVE ACTION 11 (1997) (emphasis in original) In fact. the Reconstruction Congress
enacted just such legislation, and it did so repeatedly That Congress also passed non-color-b.sed remedial
legislation in this era, such as the Freedmen's Bureau Acts. or provisions for the reliet of all destitute
persons in the District of Columbia, see. e.g., Resolution of Apr 17. 1866. No 25. 14 Stat 347, 353. does
not alter this fact. A full list of "race-conscious remedial legislation" of the penod %% ould also include the
many federal grants of aid to Indians. which represented race- or blood bas" remedial legislation on an
enormous scale. See, e.g., Resolution of Dec 21. 1865. No 1. 14 Stat 347. 347 (authonLing the
expenditure of $500,000 "for the immediate subsistence and clothing of destitute Indians") It would also
be proper to add the special allocations of federal resources for "colored schools" See. e g . Act of July
28, 1866, ch. 308, 14 Stat. 310, 343 (donating federally owned land in the Distnct of Columbia "or the
sole use of schools for colored children")
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abhor judicial "activism," or who hold that the legal practices at the time of
enactment "say what they say" and dictate future interpretation,24 cannot
categorically condemn color-based distribution of governmental benefits as
they do.
I am no originalist, so I cannot regard the practices of Congress in the
1860s as dispositive of affirmative action's constitutionality. In fact, nearly no
one today is a true equal protection originalist, because true equal protection
originalism would repudiate Brown v. Board of Education.' Hence the point
is not to foreclose argument by citing old statutes. It is to begin the argument
with a little more candor. The colorblind contingent must begin by recognizing
that they are calling on courts to render the kind of judgment about justice
(beyond the letter of the law, beyond original intent) that elsewhere they
deplore.
II. SCRUTINIZING STRICT SCRUTINY: RECOVERING THE PURPOSE OF
HEIGHTENED REVIEW IN EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
Apart from the debate over judicial activism, the prevailing doctrinal
analysis of affirmative action occurs within the well-known three-tiered
framework of equal protection review. A great deal of the argument concerning
affirmative action's constitutionality has taken the form of a debate about
selecting the proper place of affirmative action in this three-tiered
framework.26 As a result, a more systemic point has been missed. The
framework itself, in current form, is unsound. And it is precisely the Court's
treatment of affirmative action that has made it so.
Recent affirmative action cases have turned heightened equal protection
review into a cost-benefit test. This cost-benefit understanding of equal
protection review is untenable. To restore strict scrutiny to its proper footing,
24. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating the belief
"that the text of the Constitution, and our traditions, say what they say and there is no fiddling with them").
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). To be sure, today's originalists constantly discover new ways to save Brown.
For example, Bork-after conceding that the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause
countenanced race-segregated schools-argues that "equality and segregation were mutually inconsistent,
though the ratifiers did not understand that." BORK, supra note 8, at 82 (emphasis added). Hence
originalism dictates the result in Brown after all, because in the choice between "equality and segregation,"
originalist judges must opt for "equality," the "purpose that brought the fourteenth amendment into being."
Id. This is pure result-oriented reasoning. Originalism is no longer the method it claimed to be if judges
are free to reject the specific understanding of a constitutional provision in light of a more general putative
"purpose" such as "equality." Every view that originalists want to insist on elsewhere-such as a narrow
reading of the Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause-depends on their cutting off the move from
specific intentions to general purposes. If achieving "equality" is the relevant intention, it would be equally
originalist to say that the Fourteenth Amendment enacted Marxism, on the theory that equality and
capitalism were mutually inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not understand that. Certainly affirmative
action could be deemed permissible on this brand of originalism.
26. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-14 (1995); Metro Broad., Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
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the Court must reorient it to its former purpose: not balancing state interests
against conceded constitutional violations, but smoking out concealed
constitutional violations.
A. Background: Classificationisin
Before 1995, affirmative action programs implemented by the federal
government needed to pass only "intermediate scrutiny" to be constitutional."
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,s the Court changed course, holding
that strict scrutiny applies to all governmental affirmative action measures."'
Supporters of affirmative action raised a cry, but, as Justice O'Connor pointed
out in her opinion for the Court, Adarand's holding followed inexorably from
principles of equal protection jurisprudence well established in other contexts.
In particular, Justice O'Connor observed that, apart from the affirmative action
cases, the Court had held for decades that (I) strict scrutiny applied
categorically to all governmental measures classifying persons on the basis of
their race;30 and (2) there is no difference between the equal protection duties
incumbent upon the states and those incumbent on the federal government."
The Court in Adarand merely honored the logic of this classification-driven
framework, eliminating the exception that had been carved out for affirative
action.
As is often observed, strict equal protection scrutiny is almost always fatal.
Indeed, when the Court has applied strict scrutiny to a race-conscious measure
designed to assist minorities, it has never upheld the measure. The Court has
struck down race preferences in governmental contracting' 2 and has
invalidated majority-minority voting districts. 33 Lower courts, following the
27. "Intermediate scrutiny" applies to so-called semi-suspect classifications and requires a law to be
"substantially related" to "important" or "significant" governmental interests Metro Broad. 497 U S at
564-65. Gender has been the prime example of a semi-suspect classification See Mississippi Umv for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Boren. 429 U S 190. 197 (1976) Recent cases have
reopened the question of whether sex classifications should be shifted up to full -suspect" status See. e g.
United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274-76 (1996); J E.B v Alabama ex rel TB. 511 US 127.
137 n.6 (1994).
28. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
29. See id. at 2117. Strict scrutiny requires that the state action at issue be "narrowly tailored to
further" a "compelling governmental interest." Id.
30. See id. at 2111; see also Loving v. Virginia. 388 U S 1. 11 (1967) ("At the very least, the Equal
Protection Clause demands that racial classifications be subjected to the *most ngid scrutiny' ")
31. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110; see also Buckley v Valco. 424 US 1. 93 (1976) ("Equal
protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment ".,
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) ("lilt would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.").
32. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U S 469 (1989) (plurality opinion)
33. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (plurality opinion). Shaw v Hunt. 116 S Ct 1894
(1996). Race-conscious redistricting raises issues that other, more common affirmative action measures do
not. Some scholars have advanced arguments that could support the Court's recent redisticting decisions
without embracing the Court's hostile treatment of race preferences in general See. e g. Richard H Pildes
& Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Hanns, "Bizarre Districts. " and %bnng Rights Evaluating Elecnon
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Justices' new lead, have dismantled race-based preference plans in public
university admissions and elsewhere.
34
The critical holding of Adarand was that all laws employing a racial
classification must undergo strict scrutiny, with no exception made on the basis
of allegedly benign intentions. 5 The classification itself is the constitutionally
suspect feature of the law, the feature that triggers heightened scrutiny,
regardless of which race happens to be burdened, and regardless of the
particular burdens imposed. "'[T]he standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited
by a particular classification .... 36
As you might expect, opinions dissenting from this classificationist
approach have argued that it makes no sense to treat the "classification as a
talisman which-without regard to the rights involved or the persons
affected-calls into effect a heavier burden of judicial review." As you might
not expect, the words just quoted were written by Justice (now Chief Justice)
William Rehnquist.
37
Rehnquist was dissenting from Craig v. Boren, a case involving an
Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of certain alcoholic drinks to men under
twenty-one, while permitting women to buy these drinks at eighteen. 38 Justice
William Brennan, writing for the Court, took advantage of the case to
announce for the first time that all laws using a "gender-based" classification
would be subject to intermediate scrutiny.39 The Court struck down the statute
under this test.40 Justice Rehnquist (together with Chief Justice Burger)
dissented, protesting the Court's "conclusion that men challenging a gender-
based statute which treats them less favorably than women may invoke a more
stringent standard of judicial review than pertains to most other types of
classification."'" Yet, a few years later, Rehnquist began joining opinions
holding that whites challenging a race-based statute which treats them less
favorably than blacks may invoke the most stringent standard of judicial
review.42 Without a word of explanation, he has written and joined opinions
treating the "classification as a talisman which-without regard to the rights
District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993).
34. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.) (invalidating race preferences in law school
admissions), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996);
see also Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (invalidating race preferences
in employee layoff decisions under Title VII), cert, granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997).
35. See 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
36. Id. at 2111 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (plurality opinion)).
37. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 220 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. See id. at 191-92.
39. Id. at 197.
40. See id. at 204.
41. Id. at 217 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492-96 (1989) (plurality opinion).
[Vol. 107: 427
Affirmative Action
involved or the persons affected-calls into effect a heavier burden of judicial
review.
' 43
The point, once again, is not to stop debate with a charge of inconsistency
(might not a similar charge, in reverse, be rung up against Justice Brennan's
account?). Rather, the point is that Rehnquist was correct in his earlier
decision. The Court's classification-driven framework is illogical and
untenable.
One very familiar way to argue this point is to say that the Court has in
effect created "a 'moral [and] constitutional equivalence' ... between laws
designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of
race in order to foster ... equality."''  But inasmuch as opponents of
affirmative action affirmatively embrace this equivalence-the phrase just
quoted belongs to Justice Thomas and is preceded by "1 believe that there
is"45-let's put this argument aside for now. We can demolish the
classification-as-talisman framework without it.
A single example demonstrates how. Imagine a state imposing legal
disabilities on the poor--defined in terms of some dollar amount of immediate-
family wealth or income. For example, suppose that California adopts by
referendum a "War on Poverty Initiative" barring the poor from voting, from
attending educational institutions beyond high school, from accepting
employment other than manual labor, and from checking in at nice hotels.
Consider only whether this law should be held unconstitutional as a violation
of equal protection in the absence of any alleged infringement of other
constitutionally fundamental rights (such as the right to vote). Certainly it
should. A court should strike it down as a blatantly unconstitutional form of
legally mandated, status-based inequality relegating the poor to a second-class
citizenship wholly unacceptable under the Fourteenth Amendment.
But how would this law be analyzed under current doctrine? The Court has
expressly held that "poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification."''
With good reason. For under the current framework, if the Court were to deem
wealth classifications suspect, or even "semi-suspect," then every law
incorporating such a classification would be subject to heightened equal
protection scrutiny. It would make no difference whether the classification
burdened the rich or the poor. Accordingly, the entire vast array of means-
tested assistance programs, federal and state, would become presumptive
violations of equal protection. Progressive taxation would almost certainly fall.
Libertarians might envy such doctrine, but no sane judge today would suggest
43. Craig, 429 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist. J., dissenting). 3ee 3iupra text accompanying note 37
44. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097. 2119 (1995) (Thomas. J . concurrmng)
(quoting id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting)),
45. Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J.. concurring)
46. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980)
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that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the rich and the poor an equal right
to receive food stamps.
If, however, wealth classifications are subjected to mere rational basis
review, California's War on Poverty Initiative might well stand. Poverty
doubtless correlates rationally with illiteracy, and literacy is a constitutionally
permissible qualification for suffrage.47 Barring the poor from matriculating
at universities or checking in at nice hotels would be rationally related to the
goal of screening out those who cannot pay their way. In addition, forcing the
poor into manual labor might create (coupled, perhaps, with an elimination of
the minimum wage) a superabundance of low-wage employees profitable to
large sectors of the national economy. Under the rational basis test, these
conceivable advancements of legitimate state interests should be sufficient to
validate some or all of the Initiative.
I do not mean that today's Court would uphold the War on Poverty
Initiative. I have no doubt that the Court would strike it down. The point is
that this result would not square with current classificationist equal protection
analysis, which cannot easily embrace both the invalidity of California's
hypothetical poor law and the validity of our actual poor laws.
B. Smoking
What has gone wrong here is straightforward. An equal protection doctrine
requiring an exact fit between the measures adopted by state actors and the
interests these measures are said to advance makes good sense when a law
singles out a particular class of persons for adverse treatment and there is
reason to fear that the law seeks to achieve an impermissible purpose relating
to this group, a purpose that the legislators will try to conceal behind
noninvidious, group-neutral public policy explanations. For example, in the
not-too-distant past, a law banning blacks from voting might have been
defended in terms of assuring literacy among voters. The manifest overbreadth
and underbreadth of such a law (so defended) would demonstrate that the law's
true purpose was not in fact race-neutral. Used this way, strict scrutiny serves
as a test of ulterior state interests. Its function, to paraphrase John Ely, is to
smoke out illegitimate purposes that cannot be a valid basis for state action
under the Equal Protection Clause.4" Heightened scrutiny of a racial
47. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45,50-54 (1959). Congress banned
the use of some literacy tests in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994), the relevant
provisions of which were upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
48. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 146 (1980) ("[Flunctionally, special scrutiny,
in particular its demand for an essentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of 'flushing out' unconstitutional
motivation ...."). If there is a meaningful difference between motivation, intention, and purpose in this
context, I regard intentions and purposes, rather than motivations, as the appropriate object of inquiry. For
example, it may be possible to regard what is being smoked out as the intention or purpose that a citizen
would reasonably impute to the law (or that which a rational, consistent legislature would have had to enact
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classification permits a court to conclude, in effect, "If the state were really
interested in race-neutral purpose x, it would not have done what it did."
But the same analysis makes little sense where the race-based purposes
behind a law are undisputed. In those circumstances there is nothing to smoke
out. No strict scrutiny would be necessary to invalidate a law banning blacks
from taking designated jobs if the law's professed purpose was to maintain
white supremacy. (But of course that sort of purpose will rarely be professed.)
Similarly, no strict scrutiny is called for when the undisputed purpose of a law
is to assist members of one race at a cost to members of another. The sole
question is whether the conceded race-based purpose is constitutionally
legitimate. This is why a court cannot resolve the constitutionality of group-
assistance measures such as welfare or affirmative action through
classification-driven heightened scrutiny. Determining whether the relevant
state interests are legitimate or illegitimate must precede the application of
heightened scrutiny. Because it elides this critical inquiry, classificationism
cannot properly vindicate equal protection principles.
In other words, for the application of heightened scrutiny to a group
classification to make sense, two things must be true. First, some legislative
interest related to this group must be illegitimate. Second, there must be good
reason to believe that the purpose of a law using this group classification is to
further the illegitimate group-related interest (despite the state's claims that
other, legitimate interests underlie the law). Hence laws that assist the poor
properly attract no constitutional attention. Helping the poor has never been
held an unconstitutional state purpose, and there is no adequate reason to
suspect any other, invidious objective behind such laws. 9 By contrast, a law
like the War on Poverty Initiative ought to be regarded as highly suspect, for
a state could hardly claim that such a law is designed to help the poor,5° and
there would be every reason to suspect that an illegitimate state purpose is
being carried out. A group classification as such is insufficient to trigger strict
scrutiny. Rather, as Justice Rehnquist observed in Craig, the propriety of
heightened scrutiny depends on "the rights involved and the persons
affected." 5'
C. Costs and Benefits
An objection. "Now just a minute, Lester," someone may say. "You've got
the law), rather than the motivations actually obtaining. This issue raises diflicult qucstions that I do not
try to answer in this Essay.
49. Redistributive motives have not been held constittutionally suspect since the demise ol Lachner v
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See, e.g., Hawaii Hous Auth v Midkilf. 467 U S 229 (19 4) (holding that
redistribution of land ownership to remedy "land oligarchy'" is a legitimate state purpose)
50. For more on the issue of paternalism, see infra Suhsection Ill A.1
51. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 220 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting)
1997]
The Yale Law Journal
it all wrong. You're treating race classifications as a signal for something else,
which, if present, would make the law constitutionally out of bounds. But the
race classification is itself the constitutional evil, regardless of the intentions
behind it. That's the difference between race and wealth classifications: Race
classifications are always constitutionally odious, whereas wealth classifications
are only sometimes so. Strict scrutiny of race classifications is not a hidden-
purpose test. It is a test to determine whether this constitutional evil-legally
classifying persons on the basis of race-is justifiable in the case at hand.
Strict scrutiny tests whether there exist sufficiently important state interests that
can be achieved only by what would otherwise be an unconstitutional
classification."
This objection, if correct, would be decisive. For on this objection, strict
scrutiny would not be a smoking-out device at all; rather, it would be a cost-
benefit justificatory test. Strict scrutiny would serve to determine whether a
law that causes acknowledged constitutional harms is justified by sufficiently
important benefits that a less constitutionally costly ("better tailored" or "less
restrictive") law could not have achieved. Recast this way, strict scrutiny for
race classifications would appear to make sense after all. All race
classifications would properly demand strict scrutiny, because all such
classifications, regardless of their purpose, would be deemed a constitutional
evil that could not stand in the absence of compelling justification.
Recasting strict scrutiny as a cost-benefit justificatory test, rather than a
smoking-out device, is exactly what must be done, and it is what the Court has
in fact been obliged to do, in order to render its classificationist logic coherent.
Thus, in Adarand, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court held:
[W]henever the government treats any person unequally because of
his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely
within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection .... The application of strict scrutiny, in turn, determines
whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the infliction of
that injury.12
Contrast this formulation with the corresponding sentence from Justice
O'Connor's 1989 opinion in Croson: "Absent searching judicial inquiry into
the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of
determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority . . . ."" This earlier formulation reflects the smoking-out view. The
opinion says so explicitly: "[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out'
52. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2114 (1995) (emphasis added).
53. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
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illegitimate uses of race."'54 In other words, strict scrutiny in this Croson
formulation serves to determine whether a law was "in fact motivated ' by
assumptions "of racial inferiority" or "illegitimate racial prejudice." 5 By
contrast, the Adarand formulation makes no pretense of discovering whether
an affirmative action measure "in fact" rests on "illegitimate racial prejudice."
Instead, all racial classifications are said to inflict a constitutional "injury"-an
injury that "falls squarely within the language and spirit" of the Equal
Protection Clause-and strict scrutiny is necessary to test whether this injury
is justified in a given case.
Not that Justice O'Connor's two opinions are irreconcilable. But the
Adarand formulation represents what may be the Court's first unequivocal
embrace of the justificatory view-an embrace logically necessary to make
sense of the current treatment of affirmative action. It is logically necessary
because the idea that the proponents of affirmative action programs are "in fact
motivated" by "illegitimate notions of racial inferiority" is so implausible that
the Court itself has never taken it seriously. In no case has the Court held or
even suggested that an affirmative action plan's failure to satisfy strict scrutiny
shows that its proponents were actually secret adherents of The Bell Curve.6
Instead, the Justices have stressed the danger that affirmative action will
"foster harmful and divisive stereotypes" or "reinforce" racialist thinking, even
though these costs may have been entirely "unintended." 7 With respect to
such unintended costs, strict scrutiny can be justified only as a justificatory
test-a test measuring whether these constitutional costs are justified in a given
case by offsetting social benefits.
At issue, then, are two very different understandings of strict scrutiny and
its "compelling state interest" test. On the smoking-out view, to conclude that
a law passes strict scrutiny is to hold that the law does no constitutional
harm-does not violate the relevant constitutional norm-at all. This is so
because the constitutional injury would have consisted in the government's
pursuit of a constitutionally impermissible objective, and strict scrutiny serves
to test the government's claim that a permissible state interest fully explains
the law at issue. But on the cost-benefit view, to conclude that a law passes
the compelling state interest test is to find that the law is permissible even
though a constitutional injury is inflicted-even though a general constitutional
norm or principle (such as the norm or principle of colorblindness) has been
violated.
54. Id. (plurality opinion).
55. Id. (plurality opinion).
56. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLFS MURRAY. Tti- BIL CURVI (11)94) On the tontrary. an
adherent of The Bell Curve could be expected to oppose allirmtalve iction See id ,at 447.508
57. E.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1963 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("lostrc hanullul and divisive
stereotypes"); Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas. J . concumng) t'rcmiloac the %ay ol thinking
that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred"). 3ee al.o Cron. 488 U S at 520 tScilia. J.
concurring); infra Sections IlA-B,
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This shift in the meaning of strict scrutiny represents a little-noticed but
profound transformation in equal protection law. To put it bluntly, current
doctrine uses strict scrutiny as an escape hatch through which government can,
with impunity, violate equal protection principles in the name of more
important state interests. Strict scrutiny is no longer a means of smoking out
concealed violations of constitutional principles. It is a means of "justif[ying]"
a conceded constitutional "injury." 8 I do not mean that the Court has fallen
into a foolish semantic trap, telling us that a law violating the Equal Protection
Clause sometimes does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Obviously, the
Court's official formulation is that a law, when it passes strict scrutiny, does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause at all. But strict scrutiny now serves,
expressly and self-consciously, as a justificatory test in which important state
interests are permitted to outweigh acknowledged constitutional injuries.
"And what is so wrong with this understanding of strict scrutiny?"
someone may ask. "It seems not only sensible, but clearly correct. The fact
that strict scrutiny, when survived, permits the perpetration of a constitutional
injury is the very reason that strict scrutiny is, and should be, fatal in nearly
every case. Racial classifications do indeed violate the letter and spirit of the
Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, they do indeed cause harms that are of
special constitutional significance. Therefore they should never be "permitted
unless the law is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest."
On the contrary, if race classifications do in fact fall squarely within the
language and spirit of the Equal Protection Clause, they should be held
unconstitutional even if they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest. There is something deeply wrong with the cost-benefit picture of strict
scrutiny. Economizing equal protection is unacceptable.
Suppose a state embarked on a program of wholesale racial expulsion and
apartheid. Backers of the law might offer to demonstrate, with impeccable
social scientific data, that their program will sharply reduce crime and
eradicate racial violence, saving billions of dollars and x lives per year.
Moreover, they offer to prove that only these extreme measures can achieve
the desired results. How are the courts to respond?
Perhaps someone will say that judges must scrutinize the validity of the
state's empirical showing. Perhaps the courts can find data suggesting that
racial expulsion and segregation will actually increase violence, or perhaps
judges can identify less race-restrictive means to reduce violence by the same
amount. But what if no one can effectively rebut the state's empirical claims?
Is the court to hold that saving x lives is not a compelling state interest? Surely
the constitutionality of the state's program under the Equal Protection Clause
cannot really turn on someone's ability to puncture the state's empirical
showing. A law whose express purpose is racial apartheid or expulsion is
58. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
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unconstitutional per se, because racial purification of society is an objective
that no legislature can pursue under the Fourteenth Amendment-period. The
Constitution does not permit a state to treat members of a particular race as
viral agents within the body politic-period. This prohibition does not rest on
an empirical proposition. It does not rest on the proposition that apartheid or
expulsion would fail to be cost-justified or would produce no compelling
benefits. It rests on a principle of equality under law that cannot be
economized.
Offsetting state benefits cannot "justify" a law violating an individual's
equal protection rights. That is what it means to have an equal protection right;
the right is not subject to any ordinary cost-benefit calculus. Treating an ethnic
group as a menial class may serve any number of compelling state interests.
Most peoples since the dawn of time have thought as much. Racial subjugation
might even, conceivably, produce the greatest happiness for the greatest
number. But the Fourteenth Amendment blocks every state action directed to
this end, whatever interests it might serve.
To this conclusion, someone might object that the harms of racial
expulsion and apartheid are so great that virtually no state interests are
sufficient to outweigh them. If so, then the fact that racial expulsion and
apartheid are categorically unconstitutional does not show the untenability of
the cost-benefit justificatory approach. Rather (it might be said), the example
is rigged, because it invokes a law whose constitutional costs are so high that
almost nothing could justify inflicting them.
Observe that this objection implies that racial classifications vary in the
constitutionally cognizable harms that they cause and that the weightiness of
the state interests they must serve should vary accordingly. This idea is
precisely what current doctrine rejects. A generalized sliding-scale balancing
approach weighing differently the harms threatened by different kinds of racial
classifications would obliterate the classificationist framework and instead
vindicate the claim that everything depends upon the rights at stake and the
parties affected.
Moreover, the objection is incorrect. The logic of the preceding argument
turned not on the "high costs" of racial expulsion and apartheid, but on the
manifest constitutional impermissibility of ethnic cleansing as a state purpose.
The same analysis would have applied to any law whose purpose is to
recognize or perpetuate the superiority of a particular race. Thus, a law
forbidding blacks to enter universities is also categorically unconstitutional, no
matter what compelling interests it might be said to further; so is a law
requiring blacks to sit in the back of the bus. Unconstitutional race
discrimination is unconstitutional not because its costs generally outweigh its
benefits, with strict scrutiny serving to pick out the exceptions. Rather,
unconstitutional race discrimination is unconstitutional because laws with racist
1997]
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purposes are constitutionally forbidden, with strict scrutiny helping to
determine whether such racist purposes are in play.
In fact, the entire three-tiered framework of equal protection review
becomes almost unintelligible on the cost-benefit view of heightened scrutiny.
For example, on the cost-benefit view, what are we to say of the cases that
evaluate claims of sex discrimination through intermediate scrutiny?59 The
cost-benefit view would have to hold that gender classifications as such inflict
a constitutional injury, but that this injury could be overridden by merely
"significant," rather than "compelling," state interests. How can this lower
standard of review be defended? Would the Court say that a law denying
women rights enjoyed by men does not quite fall "squarely within the language
and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection"?6" Or is it that
women's equality rights are not worth quite as much? For that matter, what are
we to say of rational basis review? Shall we say that every law inflicts a little
constitutional injury, but that the costs of this injury are so small that a merely
rational relation to a legitimate state interest is sufficient to offset them?
Rational basis review is not justificatory. Rather, it tests whether a law can
be rationally explained only by reference to an illegitimate purpose. Its
lenience is explained by the absence of indicia providing reason to suspect that
the law's true purpose is something other than the advancement of legitimate
state interests. Similarly, the lower standard of review for sex discrimination
is premised on the theory that there is less reason to fear invidious
discriminatory purposes in the case of laws differentiating on the basis of sex
than in the case of laws differentiating on the basis of race. This proposition
is at least arguable; think of sex-segregated bathrooms as compared to race-
segregated bathrooms. By contrast, the idea that women's equal protection
rights are worth less than others', which is the implication of intermediate
scrutiny on the justificatory view, is risible. A law that violates "the language
and spirit" of the Equal Protection Clause cannot be justified by significant
governmental interests.
This argument does not rule out the possibility that an ethnic or racial
group might temporarily be subjected to adverse laws in the face of imminent
catastrophe. If a virus poised to kill tens of thousands were containable by (and
only by) immediately quarantining every Jewish person in the nation, such a
quarantine would presumably be constitutional. This result would follow on the
analysis proposed here because there would be no illegitimate state purpose
being pursued.6 But strict scrutiny cannot be the violation-justifying test the
59. See cases cited supra note 27.
60. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
61. A temporary quarantine is not equivalent to permanent or indefinite apartheid. Specifying exactly
what makes a particular state objective such as apartheid impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause
is not a trivial task. I return to this problem below. See infra Section III.A. But while a temporary racial
separation order in very confined contexts might be constitutional, permanent racial separation laws can
never be. Cf, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (rejecting permanent race
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Court's affirmative action cases suggest it is. Rather, strict scrutiny ought to
be what it always was: a test for smoking out ulterior, unconstitutional state
purposes.
D. Implications
Returning strict scrutiny to its proper function would have profound
implications not only for equal protection law, but for every domain of
constitutional law where the compelling state interest test figures.? Exploring
these more general implications will have to await another day. But what
conclusions follow for affirmative action? Granting everything I have argued
thus far, a court would not yet have reason to find affirmative action
constitutional or unconstitutional. Straightening out strict scrutiny cannot
answer the ultimate question of affirmative action's constitutionality. Returning
strict scrutiny to its smoking-out function cannot even determine which level
of scrutiny should apply to affirmative action programs. The appropriate
standard of equal protection review in any given context must follow from a
prior determination of the legitimacy of the relevant state interests.
The admitted purpose of most affirmative action programs is to assist
blacks and other minorities by granting them opportunities denied to whites.
If this is not a permissible governmental purpose, then the machinery of strict
scrutiny would be entirely appropriate in affirmative action cases. Why?
Because once the Supreme Court established the impermissibility of this race-
conscious objective, defenders of all subsequently litigated affirmative action
programs would defend their measures in terms of race-neutral interests, such
as achieving a diversity of backgrounds or perspectives in a particular
institution. This race-neutral defense of race-classifying measures would quite
properly call for heightened scrutiny, under which most affirmative action
measures would probably be struck down. But if affirmative action's avowed
race-conscious purpose is permissible, then in the absence of reason to believe
that a given program actually served other, unconstitutional purposes, no
heightened scrutiny would apply. There would be nothing to smoke out.
The ultimate question of affirmative action's constitutionality, therefore,
depends first and foremost on whether the government may permissibly seek
segregation in prison alleged to be necessary to avoid racial %iolcne)
62. For example, a cost-benefit version of stinct scrutinN appears to ha~e been the one used %sith
dubious success in free exercise doctrne until it was overruled in the well-knon Snaih case See e V
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). htnited bv Employment Di% % Smith. 494 U S 872 419)0
Hence the analysis suggested here might provide a strong defense ol Snsith The compelling state interest
test also plays an important role in free speech docine See e g. Austin Mii.higan Chamber ot
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990). See genierall) Eugene Volokh. Freedum of Speeh Permt 3tble
Tailoring and Traiscending Strict Scrunny. 144 U PA L Ri-v 2417 (19961 Here, too. usclul results might
be achieved by distinguishing those cases in which stict scrutiny has been used to smoke out iniperm.wible
purposes from the cases in which it has been used as a cost-benefit test
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to aid blacks or other minorities by granting them opportunities denied to
whites. This question calls for the exercise of judgment-normative,
interpretive, constitutional judgment. It cannot be answered through the proxy
of any standard of review, heightened or lowered, because it precedes the
determination of which standard of review to apply. Affirmative action's
constitutionality demands a confrontation with the debate over colorblindness
in constitutional law. But as we shall see, within this debate, the proper
function of strict scrutiny, together with the impropriety of an equal protection
jurisprudence that tries to measure racial costs and benefits, will reemerge as
an extremely important issue.
III. THE COLOR OF LAW
Almost every move and countermove in the colorblindness debate is by
now well known. One camp says that affirmative action is racial discrimination
all over again.63 The other replies that offering a long-oppressed group special
opportunities cannot be regarded as the moral equivalent of the racism it seeks
to redress." On the one hand, racial classifications are said to be divisive and
inconsistent with the ideal of equality under law.65 On the other,
colorblindness is said to be a deceptive and unjust neutrality given the facts,
past and present, of race discrimination in America.66 One side says that
affirmative action stigmatizes, entrenches invidious stereotypes, and threatens
to undermine minority success in the long run.67 The other replies that
minorities are already stigmatized, stereotyped and undermined, and that
affirmative action at least attempts to do something about it.68
63. See, e.g., TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE
196 (1996) ("Whoever would have been admitted to a school, or won the promotion or the contract, but
for race, has suffered discrimination-and there is no good discrimination."); Charles Murray, Affirmative
Racism, in RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTICE: THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CONTROVERSY
393, 408 (Russell Nieli ed., 1991) ("There is no such thing as good racial discrimination.").
64. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The consistency that the Court
espouses would disregard the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat.").
65. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 154 ("The affirmative
action system now in place ... is based upon concepts of racial indebtedness and racial entitlement rather
than individual worth and individual need; that is to say,... it is racist.").
66. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Reverse Racism or How the Pot Got To Call the Kettle Black, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Nov. 1993, at 128, 130. Fish writes:
[BIlacks have not simply been treated unfairly; they have been subjected first to decades of
slavery, and then to decades of second-class citizenship, widespread legalized discrimination,
economic persecution, education deprivation, and cultural stigmatization .... When the deck
is stacked against you in more ways than you can even count, it is small consolation to hear
that you are now free to enter the game and take your chances.
Id.
67. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring); NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE
DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 168-95 (1975); THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK
EDUCATION: MYTHS AND TRAGEDIES 292 (1972); Murray, supra note 63, at 401-06.
68. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 294-303 (1985); Randall Kennedy,




Shall we try to adjudicate these contending propositions? Shall we try, as
so many have, to make the best case we can for one of these two sets of
claims, either ignoring or trying to demolish the other? To do so would assume
that the rival claims are mutually exclusive. The truth, however, is that they
are all undeniable.
The task for constitutional law is not to amass votes for one or another
partial truth about affirmative action. It is to figure out what the Constitution
requires in light of the whole truth. Imagine: Not one of the Justices has been
able to resolve the great questions surrounding affirmative action's
justifiability. Of course they haven't: It isn't their task to do so. Rather, the
Court must begin by determining which of the undeniable truths about
affirmative action states a constitutional claim for or against it. By now, the
framing of a distinctly constitutional inquiry into affirmative action should
have become quite sophisticated. Surprisingly, it hasn't. Indeed, many of the
most important arguments on which current doctrine rests are not constitutional
arguments at all.
After all the nonconstitutional considerations are cleared away, a serious
constitutional question remains, but one that I think admits a pretty clear
answer. Standard affirmative action programs-the term "standard" to be
specified below-are constitutional. At least this conclusion follows, I shall try
to show, if the analysis of equal protection scrutiny offered in Part 11 is
correct. The argument proceeds in three stages. Section III.A argues that
affirmative action's unintended consequences-including, for example, the
stigmatization of minorities-harmful though they may be, are constitutionally
irrelevant. If affirmative action doctrine is to be consistent with the rest of
equal protection law, only an illegitimate racial purpose can render affirmative
action unconstitutional. Section III.B discusses affirmative action's purposeful
prejudicial treatment of whites (or others excluded from its benefits) and
concludes that this treatment can indeed amount to a constitutional violation,
but that it does not do so in standard affirmative action plans. Section III.C
returns to the problem of suspect classifications in equal protection law and
suggests general rules establishing what kind of affirmative action programs
should be held constitutional and what kind should not.
A caution before proceeding. Every substantive consideration for and
against affirmative action mentioned hereafter will no doubt be familiar to
readers already. From this point on, I try only to present a new way to think
through and embrace what readers already know.
A. Unintended Evils
There are three basic grounds on which to argue affirmative action's
unconstitutionality: (1) its harm to society as a whole; (2) its injury to blacks
or other racial minorities to whom preferences are extended; and (3) its injury
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to whites or others excluded from its benefits. This section addresses the first
and second grounds.
The most prevalent harm-to-society argument against affirmative action is
that it polarizes; the most prominent harm-to-minorities argument is that it
stigmatizes. Justices ruling against affirmative action have relied expressly and
repeatedly on both these arguments to justify strict scrutiny: (1) "Unless
[classifications based on race] are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they
may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility."69 (2) "[W]e subject racial classifications to strict scrutiny precisely
because that scrutiny is necessary to determine whether they are benign . . . or
whether they misuse race and foster harmful and divisive stereotypes without
a compelling justification. 70 (3) "[R]acial paternalism and its unintended
consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of
discrimination. So-called 'benign' discrimination teaches many that because of
chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with
them without their patronizing indulgence.'
Observe that the evils imputed here to affirmative action are unintended
evils. No one claims that legislatures or other state actors adopt affirmative
action programs in order to foster hate or to stigmatize. On the contrary, the
claim is that affirmative action "may in fact promote' '72 invidious racial
thinking, even though such thinking "is not the actual predicate" 73 of the law.
Strict scrutiny is deemed necessary because of affirmative action's "unintended
consequences."74
Does affirmative action "in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and
lead to a politics of racial hostility"? 75 Without doubt. Of course, affirmative
action's critics tend to forget that the relevant question on this point is whether
affirmative action fosters more racial hostility and stereotyping than would
exist without it. (To have extremely few black students at some of our most
prestigious academic institutions would also promote notions of racial
inferiority. There is something extremely odd going on when this fact is
69. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also id.
at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Tlhose who believe that racial preferences can help ... display, and
reinforce, a manner of thinking by race .... ").
70. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1963 (1996) (plurality opinion).
71. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
72. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion); see supra text accompanying note 69.
73. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens put
it,
[E]ven though it is not the actual predicate for this legislation, a statute of this kind inevitably
is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are granted this special
preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race .... [TIhat
perception-especially when fostered by the Congress of the United States-can only exacerbate
rather than reduce racial prejudice ....
Id. This passage was quoted approvingly in Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
74. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying note 71.
75. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion); see supra text accompanying note 69.
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omitted from the analysis. It is as if one were to oppose seat belt laws on the
ground that seat belts can lead to physical injury in the event of an
accident-without even trying to assess whether the alternatives one supports
would result in more injuries.) Let's grant, however, that affirmative action
inadvertently but significantly increases racial polarization and stigmatization.
Does this fact state a constitutional claim against it? Contrary to conventional
wisdom and judicial opinion, it does not.
Consider how strange the Justices' arguments would sound if situated
somewhere other than in the superheated zone of affirmative action law.
Suppose, for example, that a district judge began striking down the nation's
welfare laws under strict equal protection scrutiny on the ground that welfare
leads to a politics of class hostility. Such reasoning would make no sense.
Grant that welfare laws are politically divisive: whose equal protection rights
do they therefore violate? Those of the poor'? Of the rich'? Or is the violation
unattached to any individual-a sort of equal protection violation in the air?
The Equal Protection Clause is not a judicial license to hold unconstitutional,
or to apply heightened means-ends scrutiny to, laws deemed to embody overly
divisive forms of politics. If it were, Lochner' would have been rightly
decided, 77 and the Fourteenth Amendment would not even have overruled
Dred Scott.7 1 On the contrary, the Fourteenth Amendment would have
supplied the missing constitutional rationale on which Dred Scott could have
rested with impunity.
Our district judge's decision would be no better if he added that welfare
laws foster negative stereotypes about the poor or create unhealthy
dependencies among them. Those who believe that welfare is bad for its
intended beneficiaries may be right or wrong. But at least they have had the
good grace not to argue that putting bread on a poor man's table violates his
equal protection rights. When laws grant benefits to certain individuals, those
excluded from the law's benefits have the logical form of an equal protection
claim. But we are dealing here with alleged harms to affirmative action's
beneficiaries. Some people think that handicap-accommodation laws
unhealthily lead the disabled away from self-reliance; perhaps so, but who
would argue that building a wheelchair access ranp violates the equal
protection rights of those in wheelchairs?
Against these points, there are three principal potential objections. The first
claims that affirmative action is "paternalist" and therefore requires a different
76. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S 45 (1905)
77. The Lochner Court indicated that heightened mejns-ends scrutiny ,,,s iustified bmiua.c ol the
suspect politics underlying prolabor legislation "It is impossible lor us to shut our eyes to the fat that
many of the laws of this character, while passed under whit is cliimed to be the polite po,.er ae. in
reality, passed from other motives." Id. at 64 To understand whit "'motives" the Court %%as fclering to.
see, for example, id. at 48 (argument of counsel for Lochner) (attacking the statute at isue as "Ictlass
legislation").
78. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857)
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analysis. The second claims that affirmative action involves race and therefore
requires a different analysis. The third is an argument from precedent; it claims
support for the stigmatization rationale from Brown v. Board of Education.7 9
Let's consider these objections in turn.
1. Paternalism
The paternalism argument, as illustrated by Justice Thomas's opinion in
Adarand,80 claims that the preferential treatment affirmative action bestows
upon minorities is in fact "poisonous" and that affirmative action is
constitutionally noxious to members of the very groups it ostensibly benefits.
Justice Thomas is surely right in implying that paternalist laws can give rise
to a constitutional claim on the part of their ostensible beneficiaries. Thus,
women have an equal protection claim against a law that excludes them from
the practice of law, even if this exclusion is said to be in their best interests.
The reason is that the legal "benefit" granted in such a case is in reality a
denial of a good or freedom enjoyed by others, leaving the "beneficiaries" with
a colorable equal protection claim that this "benefit" is in fact a constitutional
injury.
Affirmative action programs, however, are not typically paternalist. Let's
define a standard affirmative action plan as one that offers preferential
treatment to minorities in the allocation of desirable opportunities, but leaves
them free to opt out of this preferential treatment if they so choose. Such a
plan is not paternalist. On the contrary, if a government official prevented
minority group members from taking advantage of such a plan, claiming that
affirmative action was against their own interests, that would be an instance
of racial paternalism.
To be sure, whenever a law grants to some persons (the poor, veterans,
billion-dollar corporations) valuable benefits denied to others, the law can be
called "paternalist" in the sense that it reflects a legislative decision that the
beneficiary group needs or ought to receive special state assistance. But this
sort of "paternalism" is not constitutionally actionable. At least it gives no
equal protection claim to the law's beneficiaries. The charge of paternalism
states an equal protection claim when officials have denied to certain
individuals goods or liberties enjoyed by others on the putative ground that
these individuals cannot be trusted to act in their own best interests. Hence, in
the constitutional sense, standard affirmative action measures cannot be
charged with paternalism.
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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2. Racial Classifications and the Potential Self-Invalidation of Current
Strict Scrutiny Doctrine
Turn, then, to the much stronger defense of the harm-to-society and harm-
to-minorities arguments against affirmative action: the defense that race is
different. Racial divisiveness and racial stigmatization, it may be said, differ
categorically from the divisiveness and stigma potentially caused by welfare
laws or indeed by any nonracial laws. This categorical difference (the
argument would go) is attributable both to the special dangers of racism in
American society and to the special role of race in the history of the Equal
Protection Clause. Surely that Clause authorizes courts to be peculiarly
sensitive to the evils of race discrimination. Surely there is nothing illogical in
a court's decision to impose strict scrutiny on all racial classifications because
of their propensity to foster racial polarization and stigmatization.
Yes, there is. Consider the primary rival to affirmative action in most
settings: reliance on standardized tests. Such tests are also racially polarizing.
They have almost certainly done far more than affirmative action to foster
notions of racial inferiority. Would any opponent of affirmative action
conclude that state use of standardized tests should therefore be held
unconstitutional or subject to strict scrutiny? Of course not. Or to return to
welfare: A number of the most prominent welfare programs have proven to be
divisive and stigmatizing not only along class lines, but also along racial lines.
Is strict scrutiny therefore applicable to welfare as well?
To be sure, standardized tests and welfare programs are facially race-
neutral, and strict scrutiny does not apply to race-neutral laws in the absence
of some showing of an invidious racial purpose. But this point of law does not
support current affirmative action doctrine. Instead, it undermines the
stigmatization and polarization rationales that have played so large a part in the
opinions holding affirmative action unconstitutional.
The well-established law throughout equal protection jurisprudence is that
unintended racial harms are not actionable. In other words, state action with
palpable, adverse disparate impact upon racial minorities is perfectly
constitutional-and not subject to any heightened scrutiny-so long as this
impact is unintended.8 How then can strict scrutiny apply to affirmative
action because of affirmative action's unintended racial consequences? Isn't it
just a little strange that the only laws in our entire system invalidated because
of their inadvertent harm to minorities should be laws that disparately help
minorities and only speculatively hurt them?
81. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U S 256. 272 (1979) ("[Elven it a neutral law has a
disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minonty. it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protevtion
Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose "); Arlington Heights v Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) ("Proof of racially discnminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause ")
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A supporter of current doctrine has to explain why affirmative action's
unintended racial harms trigger strict scrutiny when hornbook equal protection
law holds that unintended racial harms do not trigger strict scrutiny. He cannot
argue that the hornbook rule is wrong. For only the hornbook rule saves him
from the conclusion that standardized tests, which are also racially divisive and
which also engender notions of racial inferiority, are as unconstitutional as
affirmative action. As a result, only one line of defense remains available to
him.
He must say that race-classifying laws as a general matter are far more
likely than race-neutral laws to engender intolerable, inadvertent racial
consequences such as polarization and stereotyping. Some race-neutral state
action, he will concede, such as the use of standardized tests, might
inadvertently cause invidious racial consequences. But judges cannot be
expected to evaluate the racial consequences of every law on a case-by-case
basis. In the great run of cases, race-classifying laws threaten pernicious racial
consequences to a far greater extent than do any other laws. Hence they are
properly categorically subject to strict scrutiny. This line of reasoning is the
only way a supporter of current doctrine can preserve the claim that affirmative
action's inadvertent racial consequences call for strict scrutiny, while defending
the line of cases absolving race-neutral laws from strict scrutiny even when
their racial consequences are just as severe.
But this line of defense fails. Understood as a bulwark against inadvertent
polarization and stigmatization, strict scrutiny of race classifications cannot
survive strict scrutiny. Measured against this interest, strict scrutiny of race
classifications becomes a blunderbuss tool, leaving untouched a good deal of
state action that undoubtedly promotes notions of racial inferiority, and striking
down some state action that is not particularly polarizing or stigmatizing.
Defended in terms of unintended racial consequences, strict scrutiny of racial
classifications uses race both over-inclusively and under-inclusively. It thereby
becomes a kind of logical monstrosity, a snake consumed by its own jaws.
Strict scrutiny of race classifications may be the first instance in our
jurisprudence of a constitutional doctrine unconstitutional under itself.
To be strictly accurate, we cannot know whether current affirmative action
doctrine is self-invalidating without knowing exactly how current doctrine
defines racial classifications. Under the pertinent precedent, though, the Court
has indeed found a racial classification, requiring strict scrutiny, in state action
that imposes special obstacles on race-conscious laws, especially when these
laws have been designed to help minorities.8 2 If this line of cases remains
82. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982) (invalidating a
referendum targeted at race-integrating busing and stating that heightened equal protection scrutiny was
required because the referendum "explicitly us[ed] the racial nature of a decision" to alter the requisite
decisionmaking process); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 386 (1969) (striking down as an "explicitly
racial classification" a law preventing the city council from issuing "any ordinance dealing with racial,
[Vol. 107: 427
Affirmative Action
good law, then judicial insistence on strict scrutiny of all racial classifications
would itself be a racial classification within its own meaning. If so, then
insofar as the doctrine is defended as protecting against inadvertent racial
consequences, current strict scrutiny doctrine is indeed self-invalidating.
From a historical point of view, this paradoxical result is unsurprising. A
law that provides, "Whatever privileges or immunities are enjoyed by whites,
must not be denied to blacks or members of any other race," would seem to
be race-classifying on its face. But this proposition captures exactly the kind
of law that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to bring about; indeed the
Fourteenth Amendment might itself be redescribed as containing at its core
exactly this legal proposition. Yet current doctrine, insofar as it is based on
unintended racial polarization or stereotyping, would seem obliged to regard
such a law as deeply constitutionally suspect. Nothing was more divisive of
American politics than the Civil War. Nothing was more certain to lead to a
racial politics than the rights given to blacks by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments. Any principle derived from the Civil War, from
emancipation, and from those amendments must come perilously close to self-
invalidation if it deems constitutionally suspect all governmental action that
inadvertently threatens harmful racial consequences.
Regardless of whether current strict scrutiny doctrine officially requires the
strictures of strict scrutiny to apply to itself (and hence officially invalidates
itself), its inability to satisfy these strictures remains telling. For whenever state
action cannot satisfy strict scrutiny in matters directly addressing race relations,
the inference becomes available that the true purpose of the state action is not
what the state actors claim it is. This inference applies here.
Opponents of affirmative action do not really demand strict scrutiny
because of the potential fostering of notions of racial inferiority. If they did,
they would demand strict scrutiny of standardized tests as well. At the very
least, they would have to regard the racial disparities in standardized test
scores as a strong (even if not compelling) reason against the use of such tests,
which they nearly never do. 3
religious, or ancestral discrimination without the approval of a majority of the voters")
83. On the contrary, they characteristically champion the use of such tests, without acknowledging that
the inadvertent stigmatization argument they make against affirmative action applies equally to standardized
testing. Thus, Terry Eastand affirms that "Itlhe black and Mexican-Amencan applicants admitted Ito the
University of Texas Law School] under affirmative action were not unqualified to study law. their academic
qualifications were good enough to win admission under non-affirmative action standards at fully two-thirds
of the nation's law schools." EASTLAND. supra note 63. at 9 "Affirmative action thus stigmatizes
beneficiaries who could succeed-and be seen to succeed-without it " Id Thts reasoning is really quite
strange. Affirmative action "stigmatizes" an individual at a top echelon law school by making others think
that she "could not have landed the opportunity in open competition " Id But to be assigned by test score
to a bottom-two-thirds law school, which confint that the individual could not land the top-cchclon
opportunity in open competition, is to "succeed" In other words, being viewed as "not unqualilied to study
law" is stigmatizing only when the person is at one of the best law schools It evidently becomes a badge
of success, or merely the truth, when the person has been correctly assigned to the kind of law school
where she belongs. I am not an opponent of standardiied tests The point is that one cannot condemn
1997]
The Yale Law Journal
It is precisely in its unintended consequences reasoning (whether of the
harm-to-minorities or harm-to-society variety) that current doctrine commits
itself to the cost-benefit view of heightened scrutiny. For after all, if
inadvertent consequences trigger strict scrutiny, then strict scrutiny cannot be
understood as smoking out concealed purposes. It must instead be understood
as testing whether the unintended harms at issue are justified by offsetting
benefits. The reason that the unintended consequences defense of strict scrutiny
cannot survive strict scrutiny is that it mistakes the true purpose of heightened
scrutiny, which is not to protect against inadvertent effects but to smoke out
unacknowledged purposes.
The disparate impact cases confirm this conclusion. These cases do not rest
on the idea that the unintended consequences of race-neutral laws will tend,
over the great run of cases, to be less harmful to minorities or to society than
those of race-classifying laws. They rest rather on the "basic equal protection
principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose."84 The Court has "repeatedly" affirmed the "principle that an
invidious purpose must be adduced to support a claim of
unconstitutionality."85 This "basic equal protection principle" cannot be
reconciled with striking down affirmative action (or applying strict scrutiny to
it) on the basis of its unintended invidious racial consequences. It can be
reconciled only with an analysis of affirmative action that examines the
permissibility of affirmative action's purposes. 6
Central though it has been in the Justices' reasoning, the argument that
affirmative action inadvertently polarizes or stigmatizes has no place in equal
protection analysis. Laws whose purpose is to help minorities by granting them
opportunities denied to whites cannot be invalidated by reason of unintended
racial costs or inadvertent harms to the intended beneficiaries.
3. Brown
But how can this conclusion be squared with Brown v. Board of
affirmative action because of its inadvertent fostering of notions of racial inferiority without recognizing
the same danger as a result of standardized tests.
84. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
85. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 63 n.10 (1980) (emphasis added) (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272;
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265, 266; Davis, 426 U.S. at 240).
86. It might be objected that strictly scrutinizing all racial classifications would also fail strict scrutiny
on the smoking-out view, because not all kinds of racial classification are likely to rellcct an invidious
purpose, and at least some facially neutral state action (although by no means every instance of state action
with a racially disparate impact) should be regarded as sufficiently suspicious to trigger strict scrutiny. But
this objection does not undermine the smoking-out understanding of strict scrutiny. On the contrary, it
precisely explains why smoking out strict scrutiny must tailor more narrowly the class of race-related laws
to which it applies. In other words, this objection merely reconfirms what we have insisted upon from the
beginning: that the application of heightened scrutiny, to be true to itself, must depend on the particular
persons affected and the rights involved.
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Education?7 Brown rested on the express ground that separate-but-equal
public schooling, no matter how equivalent in tangible respects, generated in
black children "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community" that
the Constitution did not tolerate." Doesn't Brown refute the conclusion
arrived at a moment ago? If affirmative action is in fact stigmatizing, isn't the
Court right under Brown to invalidate it, or at the very least to treat it as
constitutionally suspect?
No, because Brown did not involve stigmatization as a law's unintended
consequence. Separate-but-equal did not inadvertently foster negative racial
stereotypes. To be sure, the Court denied the invidious purpose behind
separate-but-equal in Plessy v. Ferguson," but in Brown and the decisions
that followed Brown, the Court decisively repudiated Plessy, vindicating
Justice Harlan's lone dissent in that case-a dissent that chastised the majority
precisely for refusing to acknowledge the true purpose of Louisiana's separate-
but-equal statute.9
No one will doubt, I take it, that American separate-but-equal laws were
in fact and by design a legal expression of black degradation. "The thin
disguise of 'equal' accommodations," as Justice Harlan wrote in Plessy, "'will
not mislead any one."'" Hence the existence of an invidious racial purpose
in separate-but-equal laws cannot really be in dispute. The only question, then,
is whether to understand Brown's repudiation of Plessy as committing the
Court to striking down laws with invidious racial effects (purposeful or not) or
to striking down laws with invidious racial purposes.
92
By stressing the elementary school social science referred to in Brown,93
one can certainly generate an effects-only reading. But the sweeping abolition
of the entire American apartheid regime in the cases following Brown' took
the Court far beyond the special susceptibilities of elementary schoolchildren.
In these decisions, the Court expressly recognized the invidious purpose
underlying racial separation laws. The true "purpose" of these laws, as the
87. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
88. Id. at 494.
89. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
90. See id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Every one knows that (Loutsiana's statutel had its ongin
in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks. a.s to exclude
colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons ")
91. Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
92. Many scholars have criticized an intent- or purpose-based equal protection jurisprudence. aiguing
that invidious racial effects should be regarded either as persuasive evidence of dtscriminitory purpose or
as unconstitutional (in the absence of strong justification) in their own right For an excellent concise
review of the literature, see Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson. The Effecty of Intent Do We Knosw
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CoRNEl.L L. REV 1151, 1160-62 (1991) In the literature. an eflects-test
reading of Brown often occupies pride of place. See, e g.. David A Straus. Discniniator) itent and the
Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHIt. L. REV. 935 (1989)
93. See 347 U.S. at 494 & n.ll.
94. See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S 294 (1955) (ordering the implementation ot
school desegregation measures); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (same). Watson v Memphis. 373 U S
526 (1963) (ordering the desegregation of municipal recreation facilities)
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Court wrote in Loving v. Virginia, was "invidious racial discrimination.""
They were "measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.
' 97
Brown has to be read in light of the great truth for which it came to stand:
that separate-but-equal was nothing other than a set of laws designed to keep
blacks in their place and that it was, as such, categorically unconstitutional.
This conclusion is dictated not only by the entire line of post-Brown separate-
but-equal cases, but also by the entire line of post-Brown disparate impact
cases as well. The effects-test reading of Brown cannot be squared with the
"basic equal protection principle" 98 repeatedly affirmed in the disparate
impact cases. As discussed above,99 this basic principle makes invidious
purpose a necessary element of unconstitutionality and holds that a law is not
constitutionally suspect just because it has unintended consequences adverse
to members of racial minorities. If under Brown state action fostering notions
of racial inferiority ought to undergo strict scrutiny, then not only should
affirmative action be held unconstitutional, but so too should its principal
alternative: reliance on the SAT, the LSAT, and all the other standardized tests
that, far more than affirmative action, "teach[] many that because of chronic
and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them
without their patronizing indulgence."' °
B. Injury to Whites
Let's turn finally to the injury that affirmative action inflicts on whites (or
others excluded by race from affirmative action's benefits). How can it be
constitutional for a state actor ever to discriminate among persons on the basis
of race? If the Equal Protection Clause means anything, surely it means that
government may not treat one person worse than another because of the color
of his skin.
This is the rock bottom claim of those who oppose affirmative action. It
is by far their most solid argument, and it is their only constitutional argument.
Here at last they make a claim sounding not in unintended consequences, but
in purposeful invidious discrimination. How would this claim be decided on
the analysis of equal protection scrutiny offered here?
It would have to be decided by determining what impermissible purposes
make state action an instance of unconstitutional race discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause. Does that Clause categorically forbid state actors
from purposefully differentiating persons on the basis of color, or is the
95. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
96. Id. at 11.
97. Id.
98. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
99. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
100. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
[Vol. 107: 427
Affirmative Action
proscribed purpose to be defined more narrowly? The contours of this debate
are well known. Everyone understands that the case for affirmative action's
constitutionality depends ultimately on a claim that the Equal Protection Clause
stands not for a principle of categorical colorblindness, but for a principle
banning only those color-based measures that meet a further criterion of
invidiousness. In what follows, I will not undertake anything like a full
elaboration of this debate. I address only the question of how the preceding
arguments of this Essay would bear on it.
1. Interpretive Method: Paradigm Cases
Part I of this Essay showed that the contemporaneous acts of the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment do not support a categorical anti-affirmative
action position. Nor can this position be said to follow either from the "plain
meaning" of the Equal Protection Clause, or from the process-based theory so
influentially expounded by John Hart Ely.'0 ' But it would be feckless to go
through various interpretive methodologies, to line them up against
colorblindness, and to conclude that the case is thereby closed. To do so would
be to miss altogether the appeal and force of colorblindness in constitutional
law. To rebut constitutional colorblindness, it is essential first to understand the
arguments in its favor.
One argument that might be said to favor the Court's current position is
the argument from simple morality. Can't everyone see the manifest unfairness
and injustice of denying an individual a job, a place at a school, or any other
valuable opportunity just because the person has the wrong skin color'? This
approach to affirmative action might in turn point to a line of academic
thought holding that constitutional interpretation should largely consist of
seeking the best results that moral thinking can deliver.' "2 On this view,
affirmative action's constitutionality becomes a matter of moral philosophy.
But if this were so, and if we were to credit the work of the best moral
philosophers who have turned their attention to affirmative action, it would
seem that current doctrine is again unsupported. For the philosophers inform
us that from a moral point of view, the standard traits used to allocate valuable
positions-traits like intelligence and athleticism-are as irrelevant and
undeserved as skin color.0 3 Affirmative action, it is argued, inflicts no more
101. Ely specifically observed that most aliirmative action would be constitutional under his thinking
See ELY, supra note 48, at 170-72.
102. Ronald Dworkin is by far the most inluential partisan ol this vtew For a rccent restatement ol
Dworkin's thinking on the role of morality in constitutional la., see RONALD D\'oRKN. FPK-txti'S LAW
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1997)
103. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPiRi- 395 (1986) t"Candidtes ae no more rcsponsiblc
for their ability to score well on conventional intelligence tests or lot their skill it Ioothill thin tor thetr
race .... ); Thomas Nagel, Equal Treatnent and Compen3ton ) 3crunuito,. tit EQUALITY AND
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 3 (M. Cohen et al eds. 1977) (arguing that aflimativc action is "not s riously
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moral injury on a white who loses out to a black than athletic programs inflict
on a short person who loses out to a seven-footer.' Tough luck (short white
man), this argument goes, but don't start crying the beloved Constitution.
I have never seen a believer in colorblindness remotely impressed by this
argument. Perhaps this is because true believers are never impressed by logical
argument. Or perhaps it is because the argument profoundly understates the
degree or nature of the unfairness suffered by those whose futures are
diminished due to the adoption of race-discriminating standards. Either way,
however, the inquiry into affirmative action's morality misses the constitutional
point.
Affirmative action surely is unfair to whites, sharply and deeply so. But
there is a peculiar notion at work in the conventional moral case for and
against affirmative action's constitutionality. Those who argue that affirmative
action is unfair and therefore unconstitutional-or moral and therefore
constitutional-seem to think that the rest of the legal system would not have
to be radically overhauled if constitutional law condemned all governmental
unfairness. Our society is massively unfair. If justice writ large were the
question, the Supreme Court should begin by striking down the entire set of
laws under which thousands of our children are born into an inferno of poverty
and despair, while others are born into comfort and security. There is plenty
of good reason, but no particular justice or fairness, in distributing goods on
the basis of the marginal market value of talents. I am far from holding that
considerations of justice ought to play no role in constitutional law. But
constitutional law is not moral philosophy, and unfairness is not
unconstitutionality.
The constitutional case for colorblindness cannot be grounded with any
confidence in pure morality (and neither can the case against it). But if not
from moral philosophy, nor from originalism, nor from textualism, nor from
processualism, where then does colorblindness get sufficient strength to
command a majority position in the Supreme Court? Colorblindness in equal
protection doctrine is testimony to the signal importance of paradigm cases in
constitutional interpretation. 0 5 All the paradigmatic applications of the Equal
Protection Clause-from the black codes of the 1860s, to the separate-but-
equal train cars that should have been struck down under Justice Harlan's
dissent in Plessy,1°6 to race-segregated schools, to the miscegenation laws
unjust" because even though it allocates goods on the basis of ascriptive, morally irrelevant traits, so do
the alternative merit-based distributions).
104. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 103, at 395 ("Illf race were a banned category because people
cannot choose their race, then intelligence, geographical background, and physical ability would have to
be banned as well.").
105. For an account and defense of the paradigm-case method of constitutional interpretation, see Jed
Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1169-84 (1995).
106. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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finally invalidated in Loving"' 7-are race cases. In every one of them, the
core evil was racial discrimination. From what source does current affirmative
action doctrine draw its strength? From Justice Harlan in Plessy: "Our
constitution is color-blind.""' From Loving: "At the very least, the Equal
Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the
'most rigid scrutiny.' ' ..9 And from declarations, even if not always lived up
to, like this one: "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry
are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality.""'
Friends of affirmative action cannot hide from these paradigm cases and
paradigmatic utterances, which provide the core meaning of the equal
protection of the laws. If the Equal Protection Clause means anything, it means
that the black codes, separate-but-equal laws, and racial miscegenation statutes
were unconstitutional. Equal protection jurisprudence is centrally a task of
saying what it means to honor the nation's commitment to abolish all such
laws. Any reading of the Equal Protection Clause that does not accord these
paradigm cases pride of place-any interpretation that cannot, without bending
or breaking, embrace these paradigm cases at its core-is not a satisfactory
account.
That is why, despite their lack of grounding in any of the academically
privileged interpretive methodologies, the colorblinders still have the strongest
possible constitutional starting point. Colorblindness offers itself as a
conclusion drawn at great price from a certain constitutional struggle.
Alexander Bickel's formulation is the most arresting:
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson
of contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation:
discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral,
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic
society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not
a matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is
gored.
11
Moral philosophy cannot unteach this "lesson." Nor can any interpretive
methodology that attempts to bypass the "great decisions" to which Bickel
refers. If this lesson can be rebutted at all, it can be rebutted only by recourse
to the very paradigm cases on which it purports to stake its claim.
107. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
108. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissentgnL)
109. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (quoting Korematsu United Stites. 323 U S 214. 216 (19441)
110. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81. I0 (1943) (upholding a curie% on persons of
Japanese ancestry).
11. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSI-.NT 133 (1975)
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2. Interpreting the Paradigm Cases
Thus the question becomes whether the partisans of colorblindness can
state a constitutionally impermissible purpose that captures the Equal
Protection Clause's paradigm cases. And here we find a strange thing. There
is a profound dissonance between constitutional colorblindness as it is currently
understood and the paradigm cases from which it is drawn.
In order to capture Brown and all the other separate-but-equal cases,
partisans of colorblindness cannot say merely that it is unconstitutional for any
state actor purposefully to treat a person worse because of his color. Brown
stands for the proposition that racial separation laws are unconstitutional even
if they treat every member of every race to the identical norms and identical
facilities. Hence partisans of colorblindness must say that the very act of
purposeful racial classification-the very act of deliberate differentiation on the
basis of color-is the constitutional evil. And this is of course what they do
say. Professor Van Alstyne, for example, has given this principle a
characteristically admirable statement:
The point of emphasis here is fundamental .... It is not that
when race is used, all persons identified to each race must be as well
regarded as all persons identified to some other race .... The thing
condemned, rather, is the assignment of entitlements by race. It is the
impropriety of the basis of the assignment ... that constitutes the
government's offense.
[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a
complete, resolute, and credible commitment never to tolerate in one's
own life-or in the life of practices of one's government-the
differential treatment of other human beings by race."'2
Now consider: An implication of this principle is that the segregation laws
upheld in Plessy and struck down in Brown violated the equal protection rights
of whites just as they did those of blacks. There is nothing illogical in this
proposition; after all, segregation laws prevented whites from sitting with
blacks just as much as they prevented blacks from sitting with whites. Nor is
there anything strictly illogical in the further implication of colorblindness, that
blacks' equal protection rights are violated by affirmative action just as those
of whites are. But if colorblindness betrays no illogic in these propositions, it
begins to betray a strange affiliation with Plessy itself.
The Plessy opinion, it will be remembered, rested precisely on the claim
that the treatment of whites and blacks was equivalent under the law and hence
112. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court antd the Confitution, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 775, 782, 809 (1979).
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that there was no unique, constitutionally cognizable injury that separate-but-
equal inflicted on blacks:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is
not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it .... We imagine
that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this
assumption. 113
Justice Harlan, as noted earlier,"4 gave the lie to this hypocrisy:
It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does not
discriminate against either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike
to white and colored citizens. But . . . [e]very one knows that the
statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to
exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to
exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white
persons.'15
The true issue in Plessy, as Justice Harlan wrote, was the constitutionality
of "state enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens
are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public
coaches occupied by white citizens..'' Colorblindness cannot recognize this
issue. To set itself against the Plessy outcome, it must perversely align itself
with the Plessy opinion. It must, with the Plessv Court, refuse to consider the
true meaning--the true purpose-of race-classifying laws. In this sense,
today's colorblindness recapitulates the wrongs of Plessy, only in reverse.
Under Plessy, no race classification was presumed invidious; the invidious
purpose of such a classification was irrelevant; instead, a race classification
would be deemed legally injurious to blacks only if it treated blacks tangibly
worse than others. Under current doctrine, ever race classification is presumed
invidious; the noninvidious purpose of such a classification is irrelevant;
instead, a race classification is deemed legally injurious to blacks even if it
treats them tangibly better than whites. Under Plessy, no race classification as
such was constitutionally injurious to blacks, even if degrading blacks was its
very purpose. Under current doctrine, every race classification as such is
constitutionally injurious to blacks, even if assisting blacks is its very purpose.
But how can this be? How can colorblindness be put on the same side as
the Plessy majority, when it was Justice Harlan who, in dissent, wrote that the
113. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U S 537, 551 (1896)
114. See supra note 90
115. Id. at 556-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
116. Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
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"constitution is color-blind"?" 7 Doesn't Harlan's opinion, together with
Brown and Loving,"8 stand for the principle that a law may be found
unconstitutional because of its racial classification as such, without more?
Certainly they stand for such a principle, but it must be remembered that
all these cases, from Plessy to Loving, were racial separation cases. In all
these cases, the mere fact of separate treatment-hence the mere classification
itself, without more, without any more tangible inequality being imposed-had
an intangible quality that did indeed render it "inherently unequal""' 9 and
even "odious to a free people."'20 This intangibility has been described in
terms of stigma or badges of inferiority, but another term more accurately
captures it. The relevant intangibility was nothing other than
intangibility-untouchability--itself.
Untouchability is a universal marker of caste. A regime of untouchability
prohibits commingling between specified classes of persons, one of which is
deemed unclean, degraded, unfit to be mixed with. Emblematically,
untouchability forbids intercourse between persons. Not for nothing did the
Plessy Court cite "[l]aws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races" as a
primary example of legislation that might go by the boards if blacks could
constitutionally force their way into Louisiana's all-white compartments.1
2'
Not for nothing did the Plessy Court hold that the Fourteenth Amendment
"could not have been intended ... to enforce ... a commingling of the two
races upon terms unsatisfactory to either."'2
Opponents of affirmative action have seized upon the principle that
correctly emerged from the separate-but-equal decisions, but they have
distorted it. Racial classifications as such, without more, are abominable where
they legalize untouchability and hence legalize caste. Without the concept of
caste or second-class citizenship, all the force is lost from the idea that
distinctions based on color are "odious to a free people." (For caste
distinctions, like titles of nobility, are indeed repugnant to the ideal of a people
of equal citizens engaging in a collective project of self-government.) Without
its imputation of untouchability, separate-but-equal is not-in the only words
of Brown really worth remembering-"inherently unequal." And without caste,
Justice Harlan's assertion of the Constitution's colorblindness must be seized
from its context, and his recognition of the true constitutional evil of the
legislation in Plessy must be suppressed. For Harlan's statement of
colorblindness was already a statement of the anticaste principle:
117. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
118. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
119. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
120. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
121. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545.
122. Id. at 544.
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The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and
in power.... But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind .... 12
Thus, the earliest-and possibly the most cited-statement of constitutional
colorblindness itself explained the imperative of eliminating race classifications
in terms of a principle against caste legislation.
In what follows, I will assume the availability of this anticaste alternative
to-or more accurately, this anticaste interpretation of-constitutional
colorblindness, but I will offer no further elaboration of it. Pathbreaking work
was done by Owen Fiss twenty years ago,'2 4 and others have mined the field
well since then."2 I add only one qualification. Proponents of an anticaste
principle could in principle take an effects-test view, arguing against all laws
whose consequence, purposeful or not, is to perpetuate the diminished social
status of a particular group.' 26 One difficulty with such a view is the fact that
the basic legal framework of a market economy has this consequence. In any
event, for all the reasons discussed earlier, the analysis here would reject an
unintended consequences view of the anticaste principle. As I use it, the
anticaste principle would apply only to state action whose purpose was to
subject individuals to second-class citizenship or lower-caste status.
Under such a principle, it is pretty clear that standard affirnative action
programs would be valid. If there is a colorable argument that whites are
purposefully reduced to lower-caste status when the proportion of white
students at prestigious public universities declines from ninety-five percent to
eighty-five percent, I have yet to hear it. If there is a colorable argument that
whites become second-class citizens when an urban police force takes
measures to have some substantial number of black officers on the streets, I
have yet to hear it. If there is a colorable argument that any white person is
stamped with a badge of status inferiority when a white President and a white
Senate appoint a black man to the Supreme Court in part because of the color
of his skin, I have yet to hear it. The purpose of such actions has nothing to
do with expressing caste animosity or imposing caste status. They would not,
123. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
124. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protecnon Clause. 5 PHIL & PUB Ai-. 107 (1976)
125. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO A.mRICA EQUAL CrrrT.INsHIP AN) THE
CONSTITUTION (1989); LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AiERICAN CONSTITTIONAL LAW §§ 16-13 to 16-16 (2d ed
1988); Jack Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE LJ 2313 (1997). and Cass Sunsten, TheA
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 241 (1994) Balkin's essay interestingly discusses the link bct%%ccn
the anticaste dimension of the Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions such as the Title
of Nobility Clauses. See Balkin, supra, at 2350-51.
126. Cf, e.g., Paul R. Dimond, 77Te Anui-Care Principle-Toward a Constitutional Standard for
Review of Race Cases, 30 WAYNE L. REV I. 3 (1983) (arguing against governmental action that
"perpetuate[s] longstanding stereotypes that stigmatize")
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therefore, count as invidious racial discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
3. Consistency
This conclusion, however, is not yet complete. The preceding section was
designed to show that an anticaste principle captures the Equal Protection
Clause's paradigm cases better than does a principle of colorblindness. But
nothing was said against adopting both principles.
If a partisan of categorical colorblindness adds to his basic principle the
recognition that racial classifications reflecting caste distinctions inflict a worse
or supplemental constitutional injury, then has he not answered all the
objections raised against him in the previous section? For now he can reaffirm
that all racial classifications are unconstitutional, while recognizing the special
injury that separate-but-equal laws inflicted on blacks. Now he can say that his
two-principle approach achieves a fundamental consistency in the law that the
anticaste principle does not. For under his approach, government must treat all
persons alike, regardless of color, while on the anticaste approach, government
may inflict some harms on whites that it could not inflict on blacks. Surely this
consistency, he might argue, is more respectful of the Constitution's command
to give every person the equal protection of the laws.
Let's assume that this two-fisted approach to racial classifications would
capture the paradigm cases as well (even if not as parsimoniously) as would
the single-principle anticaste approach. It remains the case-if the purposive
view of equal protection scrutiny discussed above is correct-that categorical
colorblindness must be rejected. For the consistency that colorblindness claims
is inconsistent with vast quantities of equal protection law, including the law
it most wants to sustain.
Suppose a state agency decides that certain workers require protection
from ultraviolet light. The agency adopts regulations requiring the relevant
employers to provide such protection, and these regulations rationally make the
degree of requisite protection depend on the worker's skin color. What does
colorblindness have to say to this banal hypothetical?
The answer cannot be that the regulations would stand because they are
rational. Under current doctrine, mere rationality review would not apply; and
in any event, no one disputes that affirmative action is at least rationally
related to legitimate state purposes. The answer also cannot be that the
regulations would satisfy strict scrutiny. For one thing, the categories adopted
might be rough and imperfect, improving the health and safety of all affected
workers, but not with the niceness of narrow tailoring. But whether or not this
was so, what function would strict scrutiny serve here?
Once all the rhetoric of unintended consequences and all the trappings of
cost-benefit analysis are stripped away, strict scrutiny has no role to play after
[Vol. 107: 427
Affirmative Action
a court has determined that the state has acted with a constitutionally
proscribed purpose. And the state would have so acted, if that purpose is
defined as the deliberate differentiation of persons on the basis of color. On the
view that the Constitution forbids government from purposefully differentiating
among persons on the basis of color, there is no call for strict scrutiny of race-
classifying laws. There is nothing to smoke out. Every such law would be
unconstitutional per se.
By contrast, the anticaste principle might well be consistent with imposing
heightened scrutiny on the state's regulations. It is conceivable, after all, that
the state's worker-safety rationale for the regulations is a smoke screen
masking an ulterior purpose. The only way to test for that possibility, short of
smoking-gun evidence unlikely to exist, would be to smoke it out by
measuring the fit between the regulations and the claimed worker-safety
rationale.
To be sure, an opponent of affirmative action could offer further
qualifications to rescue his position. Where a color classification is directed at
demonstrable biological differences, he might say, the classification need not
be unconstitutional per se, and it can be permitted to stand if it passes a
means-ends test calculated to determine whether the law is genuinely directed
at demonstrable biological differences. We might then ask why the race-
conscious integration measures enacted after Brown were constitutional; they
deliberately differentiated on the basis of race, and they were not directed at
any biological differences. Here the affirmative action opponent would
probably say that the strictly remedial nature of such measures-righting
identifiable race-based violations of law-distinguishes them from affirmative
action.
All these qualifications are coherent, but they surrender the principle of
colorblindness. The anti-affirmative action position now would not be that the
Constitution equally proscribes all purposeful state differentiation on the basis
of color. Instead, it would be that the Constitution proscribes such state action
only when done with impermissible (nonbiological, nonremedial) purposes. To
be sure, the opponent of affirmative action might try to flip this conclusion
around, saying that the Constitution allows racial classification only when there
is compelling justification for it. This response, however, (1) would fail to
make good sense of the ultraviolet light regulations mentioned above, whose
constitutionality does not plausibly depend on how crucial the protection is, but
rather depends on the absence of any invidious purposes; and (2) would merely
resurrect the cost-benefit understanding of heightened equal protection scrutiny,
which at this point in the argument we have already rejected.
In any event, through these qualifications, the opponent of affirmative
action will have conceded that deliberate racial classification is not a
constitutionally impermissible purpose as such. Instead, the ultimate question
will be one of determining what kinds of purpose render a racial classification
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permissible and what kinds render such a classification an act of invidious
racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. At that point,
colorblindness is no longer the operative principle, and a given act of racial
classification can be ruled unconstitutional only by a further inquiry into
purpose. Though this proposition will chagrin the champions of colorblindness,
it is merely a matter of consistency-of not making an exception for
affirmative action. Consistency does not reside in treating all race
classifications alike. On the contrary, that kind of consistency is inconsistent
with the equal protection treatment of virtually every legal classification
outside the arena of affirmative action.
Wealth classifications have been struck down only when used to deny
rights to the poor, never when used to assist them. A law denying
opportunities to the handicapped might be suspect, while laws granting them
special accommodation are perfectly constitutional. State laws granting special
assistance to veterans are constitutional, but it is unimaginable that courts
would let pass any state law singling out U.S. veterans for adverse treatment.
When government assists the poor, the handicapped, or veterans, why is
there no cognizable equal protection claim for the better off, the able-bodied,
or those who never served? It is no answer to say "because the mere rationality
test applies to these classifications." The very question at issue is why state
laws denying benefits to the unoffending rich, the innocently able-bodied, or
the law-abiding civilian population, are subject to little or no equal protection
scrutiny. (And in any event, if a state were to pass a law denying rights or
privileges to the poor, to the handicapped, or to veterans, I assure you that the
true mere rationality test would not be in play.) In other words, we are asking
the question that precedes the determination of the appropriate level of
scrutiny. The answer is that the charitable purpose behind these assistance laws
absolves them from heightened equal protection scrutiny. They are efforts to
help the hard-pressed, in no way imposing on them or anyone else a lower-
caste status.
The harm to those excluded from affirmative action is real. In standard
affirmative action plans, the principal harm takes the form of opportunity costs
inflicted on those denied positions because of their race. These costs are high,
they are demoralizing, and they deserve to be taken very seriously by all who
must decide whether to support or oppose affirmative action as a matter of
policy. But they do not differ in a constitutional sense from the harms inflicted
on the better-off by programs that offer special opportunities to the poor, on
the able-bodied by laws that require special accommodations for the
handicapped, or on the civilian population by state action that grants
preferences to veterans. All these programs are instances of affirmative action.
It is impossible that the only kind of affirmative action made unconstitutional




C. Consequences for Equal Protection Liw: From Suspect Classifications to
Suspect Classes
If everything written to this point were accepted, what form would equal
protection doctrine take with respect to strict scrutiny and affirmative action?
The shift from a smoking-out to a justificatory use of strict scrutiny parallels
a more obvious shift in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence: from
classes to classifications. The tiered framework of equal protection review
originally developed not with the notion of "suspect classifications," but with
the recognition of "suspect classes." When laws explicitly imposed burdens on
certain "suspect classes" of persons, the Court held, the suspicion that
something constitutionally forbidden was afoot justified more stringent
scrutiny. Which classes of persons were "suspect" in this way? One
characteristic repeatedly held necessary to make a class "suspect" was a
"history of purposeful" discrimination.1
27
At this point in the doctrine's development, strict scrutiny made sense. For
when a state singles out a class of persons that has been subject to widespread,
invidious prejudice and denies to members of this class rights or liberties that
others enjoy, there is excellent reason to fear that the government has acted
deliberately to reduce these persons to a second-class legal status. As a result,
whites never could have been deemed a suspect class under equal protection
doctrine as that concept was consistently developed and articulated prior to the
affirmative action cases. Today, in effect, whites are a suspect class--even
though the Court has never explained this result, which contradicts everything
the Court ever said about the criteria necessary to establish a class as suspect
for equal protection purposes.
The original purpose behind suspect class strict scrutiny explains why the
integration measures adopted in the wake of Brown were not and should not
have been evaluated under strict scrutiny. Everyone understood in advance that
such measures had a racial purpose. They were supposed to integrate the races,
and they were supposed to do so for the particular benefit of blacks.
Accordingly, there was nothing to smoke out. Everyone understood that strict
scrutiny did not apply to a measure of which no one supposed that there was
an ulterior, racially invidious objective.
Shifting the focus from suspect classes to suspect classifications, current
affirmative action shifts from the smoking-out to the cost-benefit view of strict
scrutiny, telling us that equal protection rights are not rights at all, but interests
possessed by individuals that must give way when countervailing (and not
necessarily very extraordinary) state interests outweigh them. Current doctrine
127. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr. Inc. 473 U S 432. 441 (1985) (quoung
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per cunam))
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tells us that violations of the letter and spirit of the Constitution are perfectly
constitutional. Current doctrine either cannot explain why integration was
constitutional or else cannot explain why racial expulsion, suitably tailored,
would be unconstitutional. (It might explain one or the other by broadening or
contracting the compelling state interest test, but it cannot explain both.) And
current doctrine cannot explain why affirmative action's unintentional racial
costs trigger strict scrutiny, while everywhere else unintended racial harms are
not actionable. This is what follows when strict scrutiny loses its moorings.
Justice Rehnquist was right in Craig v. Boren:.28 Classifications cannot
be talismanic. 29 A court is obliged to consider the "rights involved and the
persons affected"' 3 ° before deciding what level of scrutiny to apply. One
doctrinal formulation consistent with this admonition would be as follows.
Where a law denies members of a suspect class any rights or privileges
enjoyed by others, heightened scrutiny applies. And where an untouchability
law treats the races formally equally, no special scrutiny applies; the law is
unconstitutional-period. But standard affirmative action measures do not deny
members of suspect classes any rights or privileges enjoyed by members of
nonsuspect classes, and they are not untouchability laws.
Nevertheless, some circumstances still would exist in which affirmative
action would be subject to strict scrutiny. For example, if in a particular
jurisdiction members of a minority race had legislative control, and if they
adopted laws burdening whites, strict scrutiny might then be appropriate
because in such a case there might be ground for considering whites a suspect
class. "' Or there might be reason to believe that a particular affirmative
action program secretly was intended to harm members of a suspect class (for
example, a program granting special priority for minorities in an involuntary
medical study). Or if, in the name of affirmative action, someone proposed to
deny whites eligibility altogether at a university, or to subject whites to random
police searches and seizures, or to do anything else to make whites "see what
it feels like," the underlying objective could have crossed into invidiousness.
Indeed, I think it would be improper for an affirmative action program to use
race to take from whites (or anyone else) something they already have, as
opposed to denying them an opportunity for which they are merely applying.
The reason would be-to venture a hazardous distinction-that, on the level
of the intangible, such a program would pass from merely withholding a
128. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
129. See supra text accompanying note 37.
130. Craig, 429 U.S. at 220.
131. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989) (plurality opinion); John
Hart Ely, The Consttutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 739 n.58 (1974).
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benefit on the basis of race to penalizing individuals on the basis of race.
132
On this view, although deliberately offering individuals special opportunities
on the basis of race would sometimes be constitutionally permissible, no state
actor could ever deliberately penalize any individual-where penalizing is
understood through a concept of taking away something (other than an
unvested opportunity) that a person already has-on the basis of race. Thus,
standard affirmative action plans would be constitutional, but a special tax
levied only on whites or members of any other race would not.
Without doubt, racial discrimination is the paradigmatic Fourteenth
Amendment violation. But that is because racial discrimination is itself
paradigmatic of treating individuals as members of a lower order. Race-
discriminatory laws, as Justice Harlan wrote, "proceed on the ground that
colored citizens are so inferior and degraded" that they deserve to be treated
as untouchable, as inferior, or as second-class members of the nation.' 3 Not
all racial classifications treat persons that way. If a racial classification treats
no one that way, it is not purposefully invidious within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. POSTSCRIPT: ROMER AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE
This postscript briefly notes the implications of the preceding arguments
for two issues beyond the constitutionality of affirmative action.
A. Romer v. Evans
In Romer v. Evans, 3  the Supreme Court invalidated a Colorado
constitutional amendment that essentially made it a state constitutional right for
anyone (with the possible exception of common carriers) to discriminate
against persons on the basis of homosexuality.' 5 I am not going to provide
132. 1 realize that powerful arguments have been made suggesting that the distincton between not-
benefiting and penalizing is impossible to pin down See, e g. Kathleen M Sullivan. Uncontitutonal
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1439-43 (1989) 1 think this impossibility has been overstated
Obviously, to make good on the idea of taking away something a person already has. as opposed to
denying him an opportunity, we would have to rule out taking away opportunities as an instance of taking
away something a person already has. And then we might need an account of those opportunities in which
one already has some sort of vested expectation, as distinct from mere applied-for oppotunities to which
one has, as yet, no entitlement. This is not the place to pursue this line of thought I note only that it would
sustain standard affirmative action programs while potentially embracing the result in Trunwti:, Board of
Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert graniid. 117 S Ct 2506 (1997). which invalidated
under Title VII a race-based preference scheme for employee layoffs
133. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan. J . dissenting)
134. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
135. The amendment barred any state actor from enacting or enforcing "'any statute. regulation.
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct. practices or relationships
shall ... be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any protected status
or claim of discrimination.' Id. at 1623 (quoting COLO CONST an 11 § 30b) In other words, no law could
be passed prohibiting discnmination on the basis of homosexuality. and no individual (pnvite or public)
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another academic defense of Romer on grounds other than the ones asserted
by the Court itself. On the contrary, I want briefly to show how the Court's
actual reasoning illustrates the analysis offered in this Essay.
The Romer Court observed that the Colorado law seemed to defy efforts
to review the rationality of the fit between its provisions and the asserted
governmental interests it was supposed to advance. "Amendment 2 fails,
indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry."'36 The law, the Court
declared, "confounds this normal process of judicial review."'t37 Within the
reigning framework of equal protection review, these statements are strange.
They do not quite say that the law bears no rational relationship to any
conceivable, legitimate state purpose (the legal test under mere rationality
review). Rather, without adopting a higher standard of review, the Court
suggested that Colorado's law was somehow almost invalid on its face,
regardless of any possible fit between means and ends. "[T]he amendment has
the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a
single named group, an exceptional and ... invalid form of legislation.... It
is at once too narrow and too broad."' 38 The strangeness of these statements
was not dispelled by the fact that the Court went on expressly to evaluate (and
to strike down) the Colorado law under mere rationality review, holding that
the law could be explained only by reference to a constitutionally illegitimate
purpose. 131
Now, Romer's critics are doubtless correct to say that the Colorado law
was (as almost any law is) rationally related to conceivable, legitimate state
purposes." But the Court was correct in suggesting that mere rationality
review was not in fact applicable--even if neither of the other standards of
review was applicable either. How can a law be reviewed at all, if not under
one of the three standards of equal protection scrutiny? As I have said
throughout: When a law's purpose is constitutionally illegitimate, none of the
well-known standards of review applies. It makes no difference whether such
a law satisfies the rational basis test, intermediate review, or even strict
scrutiny. And the impermissible purpose of a law can sometimes be read from
its face.
This was so in Brown v. Board of Education itself. The Court in Brown
did not apply any of the three standards of review. The opinion contains no
could be made legally liable for engaging in such discrimination. An exception in the case of common
carriers-by which I mean those charged by law with the duty to offer their services, if at all, to the
general public-was by no means clear from the face of the law. But the state argued that common carriers
would not be legally immune under the amendment if they denied services to persons on the basis of
homosexuality, and the Court did not reach the issue. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626.
136. Id. at 1627.
137. Id. at 1628.
138. Id. at 1627-28.
139. See id. at 1627 ("[T]he amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class
that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.").
140. See, e.g., id. at 1631-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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analysis of the fit between racial segregation and any of the putative legitimate
state interests (avoiding racial conflict in the classroom, satisfying
"associational" preferences, and so on) that might have been advanced thereby.
In 1950s America, the untouchability imputed to blacks by separate-but-equal
was visible on the face of the law. Once the Court became willing to recognize
the true purpose of separate-but-equal, no means-ends scrutiny applied, for the
very purpose of equal protection means-end review-in all three varieties-is
nothing other than to assist in determining a law's true purpose. Hence, the
true question in Brown, as in Plessy, was (as noted earlier) solely whether a
state could constitutionally enforce a law the purpose of which was to legalize
black untouchability. The purposive nature of equal protection review,
indicated implicitly by Brown, is explicitly confirmed in Romer.
Moreover, the purpose that the Romer Court found constitutionally out-of-
bounds confirms the analysis offered in this Essay. The Court did not hold that
a state is constitutionally forbidden to criminalize homosexual conduct.
Whether the Court was right or wrong in this non-holding I do not
discuss.' 4' What the Romer Court did hold was that Colorado had imposed
on homosexuals a distinctive, degraded legal status. The Court began with a
quotation from Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent: -[T]he Constitution 'neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."'"'2 The Court continued by
stating that Amendment 2 was a "status-based enactment" that "deem[ed] a
class of persons a stranger to [Colorado's] laws."' 43 In other words, Colorado
had in effect deliberately thrown the backing of the state behind the view of
homosexuals as unfit to commingle on equal terms with the rest of the
community.'" Thus Romer illustrates not only the purposive equal protection
analysis advocated in Part II-an analysis that precedes and may obviate
entirely the application of the various standards of review-but the caste-based
or untouchability understanding of equal protection principles advocated in Part
III.
B. The Civil Rights Initiative
Foes of affirmative action, if there are any who have read to this point,
will not have found much they like. What follows may be consoling.
California's Civil Rights Initiative, which bans governmental discrimination or
preferences on the basis of race in contracting, hiring, and academic
141. My views on the constitutionality of laws criminalzing homosexual conduct may be lound in Jcd
Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737. 765-82. 799-802 (1989)
142. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U S 537. 559 (1896) (Harlan. J.
dissenting)).
143. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
144. See Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry. The Pariah Principle. 13 Co%sT Cos ..t tY-, 257. 265.
67 (1996). For a related analysis-based, however. on the concept of attandcr-sce Akhil Reed Amr,
Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer, Rightne.%, 95 MICH L R.v 203 (1996)
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admissions, 145 may well be a racial classification under the relevant Supreme
Court precedent. 41 If this precedent is adhered to, the Initiative ought to
receive strict scrutiny, and so scrutinized, the Initiative should have a difficult
time.
47
But how could this be? Doesn't the Civil Rights Initiative merely codify
as a matter of state law what the Supreme Court has come close to laying
down as a constitutional requirement? How can it be unconstitutional for a
state to ban race preferences in public decisionmaking when the Supreme
Court has held that race preferences in public decisionmaking are
presumptively unconstitutional? If there is a contradiction here, it lies in the
Court's classification-driven doctrine itself. For as we have seen, the Court's
classificationism creates the spectacle of a constitutional doctrine very nearly
unconstitutional under itself.
In any event, current doctrine should, if fairly applied, cause serious
constitutional difficulties for California's effort to eradicate affirmative action.
The "benign" motivations underlying the Initiative (benign from the Court's
point of view) should not excuse it from strict scrutiny, and the singling out
of racial (and gender) preferences should therefore be a cause of serious
concern to friends of this law.'
48
But on the analysis that I have suggested, the main thrust of the Initiative
would not face serious difficulty. The Initiative is not an untouchability law,
and its classification would not trigger heightened scrutiny, because it denies
no rights to minorities or women that it bestows upon whites or men. The
principal question, therefore, would be whether the law's express purpose
(eliminating racial and gender considerations while allowing consideration of
almost all other factors) is constitutionally permissible.'49 And the answer to
this question would probably be yes. The Constitution permits affirmative
action because affirmative action does not force a second-class status or
citizenship on anyone. But abolishing affirmative action does not thrust a
second-class status or citizenship on anyone either. In other words, foes of
145. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31. A preliminary injunction entered against the Initiative was vacated
in Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, Nos. 97-
15030, 97-15031, 1997 WL 528335 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 1997).
146. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
147. The difficulty is that the Initiative singles out only race and gender preferences as unlawful. All
other preferences that might be used in hiring or admissions decisions (including preferences based on other
purely ascriptive traits) remain untouched by the Initiative. Thus the Initiative appears not to be "narrowly
tailored" to furthering the state interest in pure-merit or nonarbitrary public decisionmaking.
148. The Ninth Circuit held that strict scrutiny did not apply, on the ground that the Initiative is "a
law that addresses in neutral fashion race-related and gender-related matters." Coalition for Econ. Equality,
110 F.3d at 1444. The difficulty with this proposition is that, under current doctrine, when a law employs
a racial classification, there is supposed to be no way of determining whether it is benign except through
the application of strict scrutiny. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111-13 (1995).
149. There might be other questions that I do not address here. For example, there might be a question
as to whether the Initiative was motivated by racial animosity. There might also be a question as to whether
its provisions would unconstitutionally bar race-conscious relief in discrimination actions.
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affirmative action should stop calling on courts to engage in an activism that
they supposedly deplore. Instead they should throw their energies behind their
Civil Rights Initiatives, the constitutionality of which turns out to go hand in
hand with that of affirmative action itself.
V. CONCLUSION
If I had to choose, I would probably vote to scrap the entire patchwork of
affirmative action measures in this country in favor of a massive capital
infusion into inner-city day care and educational facilities. But this conclusion
goes to affirmative action's costs and benefits, not to its constitutionality.
Affirmative action, with all its costs and imperfections, is not inconsistent with
the commitment made by this nation when it enacted the Fourteenth
Amendment. On the contrary, there is a reason why Congress enacted "colored
relief' legislation at the same time this commitment was laid down. The reason
is justice-constitutional justice.
Consider the phenomenal success of those ethnic groups whose cultures
enforce a strong work ethic and emphasize education. Consider how such a
culture is carried on: through families, from one generation to the next.
Consider how long it would take for such a culture to be obliterated if
members of the group were seized, carried to another place, with no records
of its former learning, with its language killed, and with its family structure
destroyed by separating children from parents. How long would it be before
all the cultural strength of that group, acquired and maintained perhaps for
thousands of years, was crushed and replaced by its opposite? Two
generations, three, four? America still pays for the crimes of slavery. We may
never stop paying for them. We never ought to, until the day comes when
black children have the same opportunities that others have. Affirmative action
is no cure-all. It is only a small effort to do some good.
All the same, I have two recommendations for those who favor affirmative
action. First, institutions with affirmative action plans should be open about
them or scrap them. If the burdens that an honest affirmative action program
imposes on its beneficiaries are too great to bear, the correct response is not
to prevaricate, but to try something new. Second, the pro-affirmative action
crowd needs to own up to the weakness of 'diversity" as a defense of most
affirmative action plans. Everyone knows that in most cases a true diversity of
perspectives and backgrounds is not really being pursued. (Why no preferences
for fundamentalist Christians or for neo-Nazis?)
The purpose of affirmative action is to bring into our nation's institutions
more blacks, more Hispanics, more Native Americans, more women,
sometimes more Asians, and so on-period. Pleading diversity of backgrounds
merely invites heightened scrutiny into the true objectives behind affirmative
action. This heightened scrutiny would quite properly reveal the existence of
1997]
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a race- or group-related purpose, rather than a genuine interest in achieving a
representative diversity of perspectives. In fact, the true, core objective of race-
based affirmative action is nothing other than helping blacks. Friends of
affirmative action, if there are any left, should acknowledge this objective, and
they should embrace it-in the name of justice.
